Beyond Blockade of Cuba *The Editors*

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Partisans of Death

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The Knife at Europe's Throat

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

Moment of Triumph

★ There was something of awe in President Kennedy's cool, reserved voice this week as he told his press conference, "I think this is a very climactic period."

Indeed, it is. By strange coincidence Chou En-lai announced his enigmatic cease-fire along the embattled Sino-Indian frontier just as Fidel Castro capitulated on the withdrawal of Soviet bombers from Cuba. In the past few weeks power alliances of the world have changed very much very fast.

President Kennedy came to his press conference in a mood which seemed to me to be a kind of overstatement of his understatement. He came in a moment of extraordinary triumph in what Richard Rovere in *The New Yorker* accurately describes as "perhaps the greatest personal diplomatic victory of any President in our history." The crowd of 381 reporters stood respectfully and then breathlessly watched the tall, slim, auburn-haired young man in his immaculate two-button suit, with the handkerchief protruding just the right distance, stride quickly to the podium and begin talking. It was a moment of huge triumph and yet he deliberately chose a tone of quiet rationality. There was no smirk, no wink, no gloating; above all no magniloquence, no melodrama. There was hardly any superficial difference between Mr. Kennedy's voice and manner now as he announced victory and before when he told America two weeks' earlier of its great danger. He was friendly and human enough, but in both instances he seemed to be trying – not quite successfully – to maintain a kind of well bred, stoic composure, with his emotion kept a good ways down.

Among other fascinating changes there is a new, odd relationship with Mr. Khrushchev. The President spoke of "fulfilling understandings" with him. Repeatedly in the past weeks the young man has given his defeated antagonist little courteous pats on the back. Is Mr. K grateful? Who knows? Now the President soberly hints that tensions might be "relaxed" in "other areas." For our part, we had the oddest feeling at one moment that the President was speaking as though he had Republican Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen over there facing him in the Kremlin.

Still Fumbling

★ It is hard to reconcile the boldness of the Administration in foreign affairs with its timidity at home on the economic front. The single greatest failure of Kennedy is the continuance of massive unemployment and the sluggish economy. This is the more remarkable since the President is aware of it himself. He has harped on it, piously deplored unemployment, sadly compared America's slow growth with Europe's and Japan. Furthermore, he knows what to do: in his economic message of last January he flatly promised "more expansionary policies" if things showed no improvement.

And yet Mr. Kennedy seemed always cowed by the thought of an unbalanced budget; at the start of the year he defensively estimated a surplus of $500 million. Economists tried to tell the President that he should have budgeted for a deficit of $10 billions to throw the economy really into high gear. Then, in mid-August, came the President's flirtation with a tax cut and his TV speech to the nation (Aug. 13). He said all the right things: America was operating so far below capacity a tax cut wouldn't touch off inflation, unemployment was serious; "We have had a 5-year period when we've been more or less standing still economically, at least in comparison to the countries of Western Europe and Japan." So what did he do? Nothing. Congress was reluctant and he postponed the whole matter until January of 1963.

Well, what happened? Everybody now knows the economy is still limping. As a result of reduced tax receipts it is disclosed this week that there will be a big deficit anyway – probably $7.8 billions. At this rate there will be a bigger deficit next year. So here we are again still fumbling toward "more expansionary policies," *i.e.*, tax cuts and massive government spending, and a year late.

It seems extraordinary that a President who can face down Mr. Khrushchev over Cuba seemed unprepared last summer to face conservative Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, and Senator Kerr, the tax boss in the upper chamber. The public probably still doesn't realize how much is at stake, and the White House has done precious little to inform them. But last week Walter Heller, the President's top economist, told the labor-management meeting group here that there is presently a gap of $35 billions between the nation's actual and potential output. . . .

Thirty-five billions! That is the amount which, by conservative estimates, we are losing in one year by having a convalescent economy instead of a virile economy. That would pay the budget deficit, foreign aid and all the domestic civil functions of the country put together for one year, including farm props, veteran payments, school aid and what have you! It would be obtained at the "cost" of full employment and bustling factories, which would mend broken families, restore workers' morale and take the teen-agers off the streets. It would also strengthen the dollar and help us finance the Cold War.

Notes

★ Perish the Thought Department – Rep. Ayres (R, Ohio), humorless publicity chairman for the House GOP, wants to end the Dirksen-Halleck performance for some reason connected with alleged ineffectiveness; personally we feel it would be little short of criminal to end the Ev-Charlie show that gives such evident pleasure to its two elderly participants. . . . We won't really know who won the 1962 election till next January when the House votes on its opening day whether to keep the Rules Committee at 12 or 15; the larger number will mean Kennedy is in control and much of his legislation will pass; the smaller number means conservatism holds the throttle.

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Beyond Blockade

President Kennedy has wisely repeated his September pledge that this country "shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." His statement will not, however, be taken in Havana as meaning that relations between the two capitals are about to become friendly. Its significance lies in its affirmation of principle and of prudence. On principle, a no-invasion pledge is simply a restatement of this country's past condemnations of direct aggression, and is consistent with obligations assumed by the US under the United Nations Charter. There are also immediate, practical justifications for the President's promise. Without confidence that the US will not use military power to impose its will on smaller countries, the precarious unity of the Western Hemisphere is always in danger of cracking. It has not gone unnoticed in Washington that the unanimous endorsement by the Organization of American States of the blockade was not a blank check for the President. During the discussion of that resolution, some of the principal countries of Latin America made it plain that they wished to distinguish between action to assure the dismantling of nuclear missile bases in Cuba and any direct intervention aimed at overthrowing the regime of Fidel Castro. The former they favored, the latter they opposed.

Further, Mr. Kennedy's statement recognizes that involvement by the US in a military campaign to overthrow Castro would produce worldwide indignation and give currency to charges that US diplomacy has returned to the hated and outdated era of McKinley. The no-invasion pledge is dictated too by the practical fact that any threat of attack from without, whether by US forces themselves or in cooperation with exiles who are CIA-manipulated and financed, would augment rather than undercut Castro's waning authority. One of the most prominent of the Cuban exiles, Raul Chibas, made this point several weeks ago, when he said that "there are numerous opportunities to begin the final battle that will end with the overthrow of the [Castro] regime. But the struggle must be the responsibility of Cubans, led by Cubans. . . . It is up to those who remain in Cuba to determine the strategy now to be followed."

The military threat to the security of the United States posed by "offensive" weapons in Cuba was never great. Now, even that marginal threat has been largely dissipated. The Administration is satisfied that the missile bases have been dismantled and the weapons themselves removed. Although it is conceivable that some weapons

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have been hidden in Cuba, they can't very well be fired from caves. Regardless, US surveillance will continue so long as there is any possibility that these weapons might reappear. The President is also satisfied that Premier Khrushchev intends to withdraw all of the Soviet IL-28 bombers within 30 days. Thus, the circumstances which originally prompted the blockade order have disappeared, and the blockade has been lifted.

Now that Cuba has been stripped of the offensive nuclear weapons, wherein lies its danger? That it does remain a danger and an adversary was made plain by the President when he said that, "we will not, of course, abandon the political, economic, and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free." What does it mean to be truly free? We do not believe, nor do we think this Administration believes, that "freedom" is incompatible with nationalizing industries or expropriating foreign properties or breaking up the great landed estates or any of the other Castro measures which have been called "socialistic." The evil does not lie in Castro's decision to use Russian oil. It lies, first of all, in what the regime is doing to the people of Cuba. It is they who pay the price of Cuba's having allied itself with the USSR and in consequence having been cut off economically from its natural trading partners in this hemisphere. Politically, too, it is the Cubans, and especially the intellectuals, who are victims of a government that would bend all wills to a single authoritarian purpose, a regime that treats dissent as counter-revolutionary. There was little enough real political freedom for the people under Batista; today there is less.

Furthermore, not only the welfare of Cubans is at stake. That small country does not seem big enough to contain Castro's ambitions. Unless the experience of the past few weeks has seriously altered his disposition, Castro will go on thinking of his movement as a spearhead of Communist penetration of all Latin America. His plausibility in this role has, of course, been compromised by Khrushchev's retreat in Castro's hour of greatest need. Yet it does not follow from this humiliation that Castro no longer sees himself as a new Bolivar, destined to liberate from colonial bondage not merely Cuba but all of Latin America.

Moreover, one must frankly admit that Castro's survival can only mean increasing embarrassment at home for the Administration. The President has so far withstood the pressure of rightwing extremists who see nothing wrong or harmful in this country's doing in Cuba what the Russians did in Hungary. But one may expect the Republicans, at least some of them, to mount new attacks on any promise not to invade. As the '64 election comes nearer, the Administration will be under pressure from Democrats as well, who will ask to be saved – as some were saved by the blockade – from Republican charges that the Democrats have been too "soft" on Communism.

These are among the reasons why the end of the blockade will not end the effort to induce Cubans to substitute a new regime for Castro's, perhaps one just as dedicated to social justice but unallied to the Communists. Yet, if invasion and blockade are ruled out, how can that objective be carried forward?

It may be suggested that the answer is to be found in a subtle strategy of conciliation. Considering Cuba's economic woes and what one must assume is some disillusion within Cuba about the reliability of any alliance with the Soviet Union, it might be thought that Castro can be persuaded to cut his ties with the Communists and go the way of Sékou Touré. This alternative of more carrot and less stick, which might include a resumption of sugar purchases or even loans or grants, while it cannot be entirely discounted and might have been possible two years ago, seems to us a very remote possibility now.

Then what? All that is left is the hope of a crack-up within. And the US can do little officially to fan that hope. Yet the hope is not entirely idle. While there is no evidence of disloyalty in the ranks of Castro's armed militia or his Committees for Defense of the Revolution, politics in Latin America are unpredictable and often violent. The strains on the Cuban economy are severe, and so long as the US continues to apply economic pressures those strains are not likely to lessen. The Soviet Union may be willing for a time to keep the island afloat economically, but it can do little more than that, and that may not be enough for the armed Cuban people. The other nations of Latin America, which at first were reluctant to help isolate Cuba economically, are now more amenable to that course. In this they have been influenced by proof of Castro's willingness to use his country as a Soviet base, and his impotence in keeping the Russians to their bargain.

Far more important, however, than whether and how long Castro survives in Cuba, is the question of what happens in the rest of the hemisphere in the next five years. The President has spoken of halting subversion by Cuba. Given the cooperation of the other American states, certain checks can be imposed on the flow of agents, propaganda material or guns out of Havana. But the most effective check on Communist subversion is public opinion. And in several Latin American countries, large parts of the public still regard Castro as the most effective champion of social justice. Infusions of weak tea will not persuade them they are wrong. They want a shot of brandy. The "Latin American problem" is not a single problem. In each country there is a strong conviction – among the work-

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ers, the intellectuals, the peasants – that it's time for more than a small change. For all its good intentions, the Alliance for Progress has not yet been able to get through to the people who are most discontented the idea that US aid is not intended to save Latin America for capitalism but to save it from Communism. The Alliance needs to speak more pointedly, to pick up a new momentum. If the ruling group in a country shows that it will not move rapidly enough and far enough to end poverty and oligarchic domination, the United States should let it be understood that it would view sympathetically the deposing of that regime in favor of a non-Communist alternative that really means reform. This is a hard thing to say. But it must be said. Moderation and diplomacy-as-usual might have worked in earlier times. They will not be effective today in countries whose desperate people are ready for revolt. Our country has often boasted of being the product of a people's revolution. In many parts of Latin America, the United States is being asked to certify that heritage. Are we prepared to do it? Cuban Communism is on the defensive for the moment, but it can only be put to rout by the unmistakable identification of US purposes with progressive elements in Latin America resolved to get their countries moving.

Chinese Cease-Fire

By withholding their declaration of a unilateral cease-fire until the very moment of their approach to the Assam plains, the Chinese made it virtually certain that the Nehru government would be the loser whether or not it agreed to talk peace on the terms laid down by Peking. For the rout of the Indian garrison at Bomdila on November 19 meant that the Chinese were poised at the head of a road running downhill all the way to the Brahmaputra Valley. Following close on the retreat of Indian troops from Walong at the far northeast end of the Valley, the fall of Bomdila had established the image of an irresistible Chinese force and an impotent Indian Army. It will be difficult for demoralized Indians and their anxiously observant neighbors in the key Himalayan buffer states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan to believe that the Chinese could have been stopped from overrunning Assam had they chosen to press the assault.

If Prime Minister Nehru takes the course of accommodation, he might find himself backed against the wall at home by a rising nationalist reaction voiced not only by the rightwing opposition Jan Sangh (Peoples) and Swatantra (Freedom) parties, but within his own Congress Party. If, on the other hand, he takes the more probable path of unyielding insistence on the withdrawal of the Chinese from all territory claimed by India in Ladakh, he runs an equal risk of a deep split within Indian opinion. The Chinese have gone just far enough in their offer to encourage the emergence of a peace lobby in New Delhi.

An interesting question that can be expected to grow in significance has been raised by the coincidence of the meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee in Moscow on November 20 and a Chinese announcement timed for the very same day. For their part, the Russians will no doubt attempt to find Indians who are prepared to believe that Soviet pressure saved India from the final humiliation of a Chinese military presence on the plains and that India should hereafter place more faith for its security in Moscow than in Washington.

School's Still Out

In Prince Edward County, Virginia, Negro children still sit on porches for hours or hang around street corners, not even hoping that the county will reopen the schools it closed three years ago when faced with a desegregation order. Some of them help with farm chores or around the house. The more industrious boys may earn a few dollars as pinboys or caddies. Or, like 10-year-old Thomas Johnson, who has never been to school, they may "play football all day." Few of these children, up to 15 or 16, can identify Abraham Lincoln.

Not all the 1,800 Negro children who have been padlocked out of county schools since 1959 have lost an education. Perhaps a quarter have left Southside Virginia, either alone or with their families. More might have gone, but it is a hard decision for a Negro parent in sleepy, agricultural Prince Edward to send a child away to school; and with even the faintest encouragement that schools might reopen, parents have hesitated. Application forms for placement in schools elsewhere by the Virginia Teachers Association (a Negro group) often carry this pencilled postscript: "We want our child returned if schools reopen."

A stubborn sort of symbol of segregation is the

COMING: *An appraisal of the Administration's record in enforcing civil rights*

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Prince Edward Academy, a private high school operated for the county's white children. Its $256,000 construction cost slights its value; many hours of work were contributed, along with the architect's design. Segregationist contributions of odd sorts distort the balance sheet; an Elk's Lodge in Florida gave several years' supply of chalk, and a major paper firm contributed toilet paper. Only this private high school has its own building. The Prince Edward School Foundation's lower grades are conducted in church Sunday school rooms around the county. Pictures of Christ are commoner than the Flag in these classrooms; one even shows Him leading an integrated group of white and black children.

Superficially, the private schools are pretty much like the old public schools. Most of the teachers are the same. But there is an emphasis on "no frills" education, with few extracurricular activities, only two years of foreign languages, and limited music, art, and physical education. The high school is accredited by the state, but not by the regional Southern Association of Colleges and Schools.

Not many parents have chosen to keep their children out of these schools on principle and tutor them at home or send them to other private schools. This year a few white childen were rejected by the private schools because their tuition bills ($240 through the seventh grade and $265 thereafter) had not been paid. Some white parents have moved away because of expense.

If the public schools reopen, the private schools would again be eligible to use Virginia's tuition grants, and most financial problems would be solved. Everyone assumes the public schools would in fact be all-Negro, or almost so. But nothing will happen in the county until a federal court compels it. If a court grants Negro pleas and does order the county supervisors to appropriate school money (they have declined since 1959), they would almost certainly do so. No one is talking about going to jail for contempt; everyone insists Prince Edward will never see violence. But there must be a court order, with a judge to blame the reopening on; the county will not voluntarily appropriate money for schools it would consider integrated. One county official, declining to be identified, said "When we have nothing to do but submit, why then we'll have to submit. But there ain't gonna be no submission until then, brother."

The closed public schools could be prepared to open in a month. Finding teachers might take longer, but the Virginia Teachers Association has offered to supply 50 teachers on short notice. Of these schools, the starkest example is the R. R. Moton High School, the county's Negro high school. It was built for $800,000 and is the best school building in the county. Moton is perhaps a bit dusty and in need of an occasional touch of paint or plaster, but otherwise it is a study in suspended animation. Almost all calendars stop at June, 1959, when school let out for the last time. An "In Conference" sign hangs on the principal's door. The class of 1958 was the last to have its graduation picture taken and hung in the principal's office. Outside is a poster showing a spaceman and proclaiming "Make Ready for Tomorrow's World." Above the stage of the auditorium, still decked out for that last graduation, a banner reads: "We'll Take No Steps Backward."

Steel–Declining Industry?

The latest word in the controversy over wages and prices in the steel industry has been a dividend cut by US Steel, Bethlehem and Republic. Steel firms have failed to pay promised dividends before, but the leading companies have not cut their dividends since the Great Depression. The economy may be growing only very slowly, but 1962 is not yet a recession year; steel production will exceed that of last year.

The companies' decision, at a time of relatively high corporate profits in most other industries, reflects the competitive pressure on steel prices, both from steel imports and from products like aluminum, structural concrete, plastics, glass and even paperboard. The market for steel has been whittled away by a succession

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of price increases in the last 15 years, so that even though US industrial production is now 20 percent above its 1957 level, steel production is 20 percent below the level of that year.

Steel firms need money to build more efficient plant and equipment so as to compete with foreign steel and with substitute materials. But where is the money to come from? Should it come from the customers in the form of higher prices, from the stockholders in the form of smaller dividends, from the capital market as increased borrowings, or from the government as tax cuts.

Traditionally the firms have hesitated to borrow to finance new capacity, and as a consequence prices were continually increased so that each year's expansion could be financed out of each year's profits. Higher prices, however, led to a relative decline in demand, and this meant that a large part of productive capacity remained idle – a shocking waste of productive resources. Fortunately for the country, steel management will no longer be able to continue this folly with still higher price increases; the market (and President Kennedy) have foreclosed this option.

Instead, part of the money steel needs for modernization will come from the government. (The new tax and depreciation measures adopted this year should bring an additional $120 million to the industry, and perhaps as much as $25 million to US Steel alone.) The hoped-for, and needed, cut in corporate income tax rates in 1963 might bring benefits of the same size.

But the government alone cannot solve the financing problems of steel. What else can be done? The evidence of the last several weeks suggests that steel is still trying to stick to its practice of financing expansion from its own resources. Frustrated in its effort to raise money from consumers, steel is trying to shift the burden to stockholders. It won't work.

US Steel saved $50 million by cutting annual dividends $1 a share. That isn't enough; US Steel will have to seek outside funds. It is no coincidence that Japan is both the country with the most rapidly growing steel industry and the country where steel companies finance most of their expansion with borrowed money. This enables them to keep prices low and utilize most of their capacity. Sooner or later the US companies will have to do the same.

Stroke of the Pen

The President's order banning racial discrimination in housing constructed or purchased with federal funds is a statement of policy which is not likely to result in any broad and immediate change.

It certainly will not end discrimination in housing, though it may have some pronounced effects in the cities and suburbs of the North where Negroes have achieved sufficient affluence to compete with whites for apartments and homes, and where there are whites who are revolted by the unwritten discrimination that prevails. Urban renewal projects fall under the order, but here the Negro is likely to be frustrated. Such renewal projects are coming to include a larger portion of upper middle income housing projects (one room – $190 a month in New York City, for example), and while in theory they are "integrated," they are likely to be all white. The Negroes and other minority groups are being forced out and find their way into ghettos, on the borders of cities.

Government insured mortgages financed roughly one quarter of private housing starts in the US in one year. It had been the dire prediction of home builders, who as one might suspect showed little enthusiasm for the President's action, that the construction business and the economy would suffer because they would be forced to turn elsewhere for mortgage funds in order to avoid the proclamation. Fortuitously for them, conventional sources of mortgage funds, *i.e.* banks and savings and loan associations, have plentiful supplies, and they may find it easy to arrange terms at rates comparable to the government's, diminishing the impact of their threatened retreat.

The President's order at least places the nation psychologically on the side of integrated housing, and hopefully will relieve somewhat the discomfort of whites who feel uncomfortable to have a Negro family living nearby and of Negroes who do not wish to be exhibits in an alien neighborhood.

National Service Corps

The success of the Peace Corps abroad has prompted the Administration to examine the possibilities for a similar unit of volunteers who would concentrate their efforts on major social problems within the country. The initial proposals, drawn up by a committee under the guidance of Robert Kennedy, and now under scrutiny by a Cabinet level group, also headed by him, could result in legislation early next year authorizing a fairly small national service organization (between two and five thousand members) which would encourage volunteer work in mental hospitals, correctional institutions, migratory labor camps, urban and rural slums, on Indian reservations, at health and recreational centers, and in other areas of social need. The corps would operate in teams of perhaps 30 each on 100 or more projects. The cost to the taxpayers would be small – between $10 and $20 million. The volunteers themselves would work for one year, possibly more if they

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desired, receive no salary, and a few hundred dollars on completing service in addition to daily living expenses.

Such a national service corps would call attention to 32 million Americans, many of whom drift in a squalid back-eddy of the 20th Century, uneducated, poorly housed, in need of medical care.

Their numbers include 285,000 American Indians, many of whom exist on a family income of $500 a year; 500,000 migrant workers who try to support their 1.4 million dependents on average annual wages of $911 each; 100,000 children in correctional institutions and the countless others who prowl the slums; 5.4 million mentally retarded children and adults for whom the world is a blur; 750,000 patients in mental hospitals whose only escape once was death, but who now face the horror of being returned "cured" to their communities – many of them slums – which contributed to their illness in the first place.

These statistics do not suggest that the nation's social problems are insurmountable, for they clearly are not. But their effective treatment has often been frustrated by the ignorance, indifference and sheer stupidity of the community which finds it easier to treat the mentally ill by getting rid of them, and handles the problem of delinquent children by looking them up. A national service corps, while relatively small, can nonetheless be the beginning of a splendid educational endeavor.

Investment in South Africa

Dr. Verwoerd is not likely to lose any sleep on account of the UN General Assembly's request earlier this month that members break off diplomatic relations with the Union of South Africa and impose economic sanctions against it. The victory for the resolution, by 67 votes to 16 with 23 abstentions, is essentially a "moral" victory for the Afro-Asian bloc which made its passage possible. Many of these nations have no diplomatic relations and a negligible amount of trade with South Africa at present. The Western powers, on the other hand, and in particular Britain, account for the bulk of overseas investment there and the largest portion of trade. They voted against the resolution, assuring its failure as a practical measure.

Of these latter countries, Britain's situation is by far the most acute. British interests have investments of $3 billion in the Republic, and while South Africa is no longer a member of the Commonwealth, the two nations enjoy preferential trading arrangements. One result is that South Africa takes four percent of Britain's exports. Moreover, three High Commission territories, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland are all but surrounded by South Africa, and obviously sensitive to any pressure by the regime. The British are pledged not to hand these territories over to South Africa, which periodically claims them for her own, against the will of the people. (Bechuanaland has become a particular sore spot in relations between the two governments, and emphasizes the delicacy of the British position. Protectorate police have been entering trains carrying black South African prisoners from Southern Rhodesia to South Africa and freeing them. Other black African prisoners being repatriated from other parts of the Continent have jumped off trains passing through Bechuanaland and received asylum.) Finally, the British are linked with South Africa by a defense treaty for protection of the South Atlantic shipping routes in time of global war.

US stakes are smaller but nonetheless of growing importance. American investments in all categories had risen from $140 million in 1950 to an estimated $700 million at the end of 1961, more than in all other African nations combined.

These commitments still are centered in gold and diamond mining, but as the industrial base of the South African economy has expanded, so have American investments. General Motors has several assembly plants; Ford, Chrysler and Studebaker have installations. So do Champion Spark Plug, Goodyear Tire and Rubber, General Electric, Westinghouse, Proctor & Gamble, Standard Vacuum, Caltex, International Harvester and American Cyanamid. It is, of course, impossible for any African to achieve any position of status in any of these foreign corporations operating in the Republic. They are run by whites.

South Africa has a rate of growth of about six percent and is generally considered to offer the safest investment opportunities in Africa. For example, it is possible for American companies to realize annual profits of 27 percent. Keith Funston, president of the New York Stock Exchange, undoubtedly reflected business enthusiasm for South Africa when he said last summer, "The whole Western world and all free nations of which South Africa and the United States are two outstanding leaders will have to work together more in the years to come . . ." Last year the US enjoyed a slightly favorable balance of trade with South Africa, exporting $228 million in goods, and importing $209 millon.

Britain has taken a dim view of economic sanctions designed to interfere in the internal affairs of another state, and it was suggested that in this case sanctions would only succeed in plunging the populace into deeper misery. Perhaps – though African leaders in South Africa have been the most vociferous advocates of economic pressure. A more cogent argument against economic sanctions is that they are not likely to prove workable, as the League of Nations found out when it sought to impose them against Italy after it

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had marched into Ethiopia.

Whatever the case for economic sanctions, the case against arms shipments to the South African government for suppression of the populace seems impeccable. The US has been approving sale of military "equipment" to the Nationalist regime by private American firms on the grounds that it was of such a nature – largely communications equipment – that it could not contribute to putting down the populace. This policy is now under review. Dr. Verwoerd has, however, encountered no apparent difficulty in buying jet fighters and helicopters from France; automatic rifles from Belgium; two destroyers, bombers and tear gas from Britain. South African parachute troops have been trained in Britain. Most recently the regime completed arrangements for private purchase in Britain of six low level attack planes of a type generally used for anti-submarine work, at $3 million apiece. It is also understood to be negotiating for the purchase of helicopters. In addition, it has worked hard to establish a munitions industry, and production now has risen to $19.6 million from $5.6 million last year. A British combine is contributing to this effort through construction of three new ammunition factories near Johannesburg.

The government's defense budget has been increased by 70 percent over the past year to $168 million. The draft of white males has been stepped up and the various citizens' defense and rifle commando units organized on a more rigid military basis. Together with the permanent army, these groups contain at least 250,000 men. There even has been talk of giving women military training.

This military buildup, conducted as part of a "war-scare" is directed ostensibly at Communism. In this instance the Communists are those Black Africans, within and without the Republic, who offer resistance to the policies of apartheid. Some of the new arms may be useful for protecting South Africa from the "war of liberation" of which Ghanaians, Congolese, Angolese and other black Africans talk so freely. The French helicopters, on the other hand, are used for spotting civil disturbances. The implication of an enlarged army equipped with automatic weapons is inescapable.

Whatever minor part these arms are meant to play in some Kafkaesque struggle between Dr. Verwoerd and unknown Communists on the African continent, they do serve to strengthen both in fact and by suggestion, the regime's efforts to screw down the lid of the police state. Outward signs of renewed suppression already are apparent. Identity cards are to be carried by all beginning in February. This means the loss of jobs and status by thousands of Eurasians who have been passing as whites. The government soon is expected to apply far more stringently its power of house arrest, and to suppress more "subversive" publications. Demonstrations concerning trials have been banned.

The Nationalist policies seem bent on plunging the whole of southern Africa into a bloodbath. Are the NATO allies, through their sale of arms, to provide support for those very policies of apartheid for which they so eloquently proclaim their loathing? If this course is pursued, the Africans can turn in only one direction for aid. And the Communists surely will provide them with it.

THE BRITISH FORMULA FOR MULTI-RACIAL RULE IS REJECTED

White Against Black

Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia

The forces of racialism and fear have emerged victorious from the debris of Northern Rhodesia's general election. Almost two years ago British constitutional experts devised a formula which was expected to ensure the development of a strong center bloc between the factions of virulent white and black nationalism. Nonetheless, on October 30 the local electorate refused to follow the middle way.

More than 81,000 Africans and 25,000 whites, Asians, and Eurafricans cast their ballots, depending upon literacy and income qualifications, for 15 "upper roll" (largely white) and 15 "lower roll" (solidly African) representatives. Following complicated instructions they also voted to fill 14 multi-racial "national" seats; in each constituency Africans and whites were paired, and voters were compelled to choose one of each race. At the same time, African votes were accorded a value about two-thirds less than those cast by whites. A successful "national" candidate had to obtain at least ten percent of the votes of each race and

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20 percent of one. Such an arrangement was designed to provide a third force between the opposing white and black juggernauts.

But the third force – Sir John Moffat's Liberal Party – was crushed. Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party (UFP), which believes in white supremacy and upholds the continued existence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, won 15 seats. Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), which demands African home rule, obtained 14 seats, and Harry Nkumbula's African National Congress (ANC), which had an electoral pact with Welensky's party, was victorious in five constituencies. Ten of the 14 "national" seats were left empty when no candidate managed to satisfy all the detailed requirements.

During the hectic, month-long campaign which preceded the elections, Kaunda devoted almost all of his time to the European electorate. On television and before countless European audiences he sought white support by appealing to their realism and by seeking to dispel their fears. Despite the skepticism of some of his lieutenants, he loyally tried to make the constitution work by giving his party a multi-racial cast. He put forward an excellent slate of black and white candidates, including nearly the entire African elite (a medical doctor, a Methodist minister, five headmasters, four businessmen, three trade union leaders, and two PhD candidates) but he failed lamentably to carry the whites with him. Almost to a man they respected Welensky's warning that a vote for UNIP would mean a vote for Communism. The Federal Prime Minister told his audiences that the Federal Army and Air Force would protect them against creeping Pan-Africanism. They put their faith in weapons and voted as he had instructed them to vote.

Nkumbula, leader of the African National Congress, once a fiery nationalist but now, at 46, increasingly expedient, has emerged as a pivotal political figure. His alliance with Welensky worked on election day, but Nkumbula has subsequently chosen to sell his support to the highest bidder. Kaunda wants him to join a parliamentary coalition and thus avoid a Kenya-like rivalry based upon tribal differences. Welensky simply seeks an anti-Kaunda front, however fragile. Whichever way Nkumbula and his followers veer, the resulting *entente* is almost certainly destined to be unstable if the only popular party, Kaunda's, is denied an opportunity to assume full governmental responsibility. Kaunda is prepared to lead his party into opposition and, like Milton Obote last year in Uganda, to bide his time until self-government is achieved. The governor, who still retains complete power under the present constitution, has meanwhile refused to invite any of the parties to participate in a government until after new by-elections in December elections. Yet the remaining "national" seats may again be frustrated (if so, they remain vacant), and the futility of attempting to legislate political multi-racialism in Central Africa thereby again demonstrated.

Despite an apparently indeterminate result, certain positive conclusions can be drawn. The UNIP of Mr. Kaunda emerged as the party with the most balanced support. The overwhelming majority of the electorate was against Welensky's Federation and in favor of immediate independence. The British Government is thus faced with a typical colonial dilemma. It could try to perpetuate racial divisions by devising new means whereby the white minority, with or without tribal support, could continue to rule. Or, it could understand the meaning of the election and therefore agree that any arrangement which does not provide for government by consent will necessarily require government by force in Northern Rhodesia.

ROBERT I. ROTBERG

THE SMALLER NATIONS ARE MAD AT EVERYONE

Frustration of the Nonaligned

United Nations

The Afro-Asians here are pretty mad at everybody these days – the Russians, the Americans, the Cubans, the Indians, the Chinese and also, a little bit, at themselves. But they are maddest of all at the Russians for the way they behaved throughout the Cuban crisis. A number of delegates feel that that crisis may be a turning point in the relations between the Soviet Union and nonaligned countries. They do not hide their disappointment at the way Cuban leaders conducted themselves, but they cannot be as angry with a small country as with a great power.

Washington's pressures on Cuba, it must be report-

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ed, have been resented as reminiscent of those which the Afro-Asians experienced under colonialism. Castro's revolution had won the sympathy of most of the nonaligned because it had been fought to bring about a radical change in social and economic structure, a process akin to that of decolonization. There also was sympathy for another small country's right to live under a regime that one of the great powers dislikes. During the early days of the Castro regime efforts were made to win Cuba over to the neutral camp, and in 1961 Cuba was invited to participate in the Belgrade Conference. It was expected to set an example for other Latin American countries.

Cuba never tired of proclaiming its support for nonalignment yet it violated some of the basic tenets of that faith, and in so doing compromised Afro-Asian support. It chose to side with one of the super-powers, thus inevitably provoking the reaction of the other; and what is more, it did so in a zone of vital strategic importance to the latter. It also agreed to the establishment of foreign bases on its soil, when one of the fundamental beliefs of all the nonaligned is that such bases should be abolished wherever they already exist. It extended the area of nuclear peril when the Afro-Asians have been working so hard to have the great powers create denuclearized areas.

During his recent visit to Havana, Algerian Premier Ben Bella had been quite outspoken on these matters. He had made it clear that while his country would support Castro because of the support the Algerian revolution received from Cuba, he objected strongly to policies pursued by the present regime. He urged Castro to adhere to an honest policy of nonalignment if he wished to have the backing of the Afro-Asians in his quarrels with the United States.

It is against this background that the Afro-Asians were required to take a stand when the US proclaimed its blockade. The two nonaligned countries representing the Afro-Asian group in the Security Council – Egypt and Ghana – urged the US and the Soviet Union to prevent nuclear war. They also made plain their disapproval of Cuba's decision to permit the installation of Soviet missile bases. The two super-powers had already confronted the Council with accomplished facts, and in the circumstances the role that the small countries could play was small. But what discouraged them from taking any initiatives was not so much what they considered to be the high-handed action of the United States; it was the Soviet response. First, Moscow assured Washington that it had nothing to fear from the missiles since they were manned by Soviet technicians, thus publicizing that the bases had been established to pursue Soviet policies and not to defend Cuba. Second, Moscow agreed to Washington's request for international inspection of the removal of missiles sites without even bothering to consult the Castro Government. "No country since Stalin's days," an Indian diplomat commented, "has been treated so obviously like a satellite."

Strange as it may seem, the Afro-Asians are far more resentful of Soviet behavior toward Cuba than of Communist China's invasion of nonaligned India. Even though the Chinese have penetrated deeply into Indian territory, there has been no move so far to bring the issue before the United Nations. New Delhi keeps insisting there is nothing ideological in the quarrel between the two countries, and that there is no point in inviting international condemnation of a country that is not even a member of the international organization and would thus be indifferent to its collective judgment. If India should appeal to the UN, moreover, it would face the uncomfortable prospect of being strongly supported only by the West. This would not only compromise eventual Soviet military assistance, but also point up the many reservations held by a large number of nonaligned countries. They are not all convinced that China is entirely wrong and India entirely right. "The frontier between China and India," an African diplomat stated, "was established by the British for the purposes of their own imperial policies. Why haven't the Indians negotiated in earnest with the Chinese? That is what the Portuguese refused to do with regard to Goa. So the Indians lost patience and took Goa by force. Today the Chinese are behaving exactly the same way with respect to the border area." All that the Afro-Asians have done so far is to invite the Indians to practice what they have preached to the great powers – negotiation and compromise.

The Afro-Asians have met on more than one occasion to discuss this problem informally, but each time no solid support for India was evident. They feel that the Chinese invasion might significantly alter the balance of power in Asia and that Moscow may no longer be able to curb Peking. They are anxious for the two Communist countries to neutralize one another. The invasion of India has furnished them with an example of what may happen when the power equilibrium is upset. Any intervention, the Afro-Asians feel, would be useless and might even provoke what might turn out to be the biggest power in Asia – China.

The Cuban and Indian crises portend deep changes in Afro-Asian attitudes toward the Communist countries, but no one is attempting to predict whether these changes will be for good or evil. This uncertainty about the future contributes to a sense of hopelessness, a feeling that no matter how much the new countries try to modify international relations in order to adapt them to their own needs, the big powers will always call the tune and pay slight heed to their advice.

MARIO ROSSI

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The Knife at Europe's Throat

Farmers Threaten the Atlantic Partnership

by Edwin L. Dale, Jr.

God must have loved farmers because He made too many of them. As a result of this little mistake, the following annoying things could quite possibly happen in the next year:

1. Britain will not go into the European Common Market. If so, the whole political orientation of the West will be in turmoil – which is far more serious than any economic results for Britain or others.

2. The "Atlantic partnership," sung by such minstrels as Kennedy, Hallstein and Monnet, will not get off the ground. The reason will be that its first concrete achievement, a major mutual reduction of trade barriers between the United States and the Common Market, will founder on agriculture. In that case, of course, the "historic" American Trade Expansion Act will turn out, historically, to be worth about three-quarters of a footnote.

3. The Common Market itself may fly apart, despite its strong beginning. And with it would crash the last hope for a generation of the unification of Europe, let alone other places.

None of these things is inevitable. They cannot be said at this point even to be probable, certainly not the last of the three. But they are all possible.

They are possible because the "farm problem" can wreck the Western world – believe it or not. What the atomic bomb and the Russian threat have put together farmers may yet tear asunder.

On the face of things, of course, it is simply ridiculous, even unthinkable, that a seemingly technical matter like agriculture and farm price supports should sap the genuine political will of all the leading governments to work toward a "closer union" for their own nations' self-preservation. It *is* ridiculous. But it is nonetheless possible.

Men, after all, are only partly masters of their own fate and democratic governments are only partly masters of their own policy. Both good sense and good will can evaporate in a landslide vote in Wisconsin; a tractor roadblock in Brittany; an agonized cry from a decent Prime Minister in Wellington; a demonstration in Schleswig-Holstein; a by-election in Devonshire; a riot in Sicily.

Let us, as a beginning, be realistic. Without exception, every important government in the Western world has been held in nearly total thralldom by its farmers for up to three decades. This is not only a fact, but even worse, by now it is a tradition. Governments have been held in thralldom not only in terms of their domestic legislation and budgets but in terms of their international actions. To cite one revealing example, all major countries and most minor ones have broken their solemnly undertaken obligations in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in respect to trade in farm products (and only farm products). These are governments, the United States included, that almost always keep their word because they try to be "moral" and because it pays to keep your word. In this one case they haven't.

Let there be no mistake about another point. Numerous powerful sentiments, political forces, traditions and economic interests are involved in the great issue of Britain's entry into Europe. But only one straw can break the camel's back: Agriculture, in all its aspects – British, Commonwealth, financial.

It is also unfortunately true that, despite the heroic achievement in reaching a substantial measure of agreement last January, agriculture still holds a sword over the Six of the Common Market itself. Several exceptionally painful decisions lie ahead, above all on the matter of prices, and they must be taken unanimously. Men of good will in Brussels cross their fingers and swallow another vermouth rather than let themselves think about what may be in store.

All this may seem odd, but consider the biggest irony of all. If the great work of organization of the West accomplished up to now collapses over this farm matter – or, more likely, if the essential further progress fails to be made – not one person in a thousand will be able to understand what has caused the failure. The number of *economists* who throw up their hands in despair at fully grasping the farm problem would fill Yankee Stadium.

This is no place to elaborate the national and inter-

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national farm problem, if I could. Let it be said only that farm economics is unlike any other economics; that farmers are far more vulnerable than any other group to the working of a free market; that foreign trade affects or could affect almost all farmers while it affects only tiny segments of the rest of the population; that governments have inevitably intervened; and, most important, that national interests clash violently and continually with one another over the making of farm policy.

The farm problem has raised the true Frankenstein monster of the otherwise inevitable and beneficial Welfare State: Governments do not necessarily have to give large groups of people new benefits, but it is unthinkable that governments take away benefits from people that already have them. And in farm matters alone does the Welfare State affect the relations among the various nations.

Unfortunately, taking away what people now have – large numbers of people, honest people, hardworking people, worthy people, farmers – is precisely what is involved in British entry to the Common Market; in a successful trade bargain between the United States and the Common Market; in the future success of the Common Market itself. And those things, in turn, are going to have a profound influence on the political future of the West, atom bomb or no atom bomb. The international politics of it, the peace or war of it, is of course what really matters.

Do I have any constructive and realistic solution to this truly grave problem? No. Does anybody else? Not that I know of. Perhaps the best hope is the sheer silliness of it all, but mankind, after all, has an impressive capacity for being silly.

International Law – Reality and Fiction

by Raymond Aron

Frederick the Great, having seized Silesia, left the task of justifying his conquest to his jurists. Some progress has been made since those unenlightened days. According to a detailed report published by the *New York Times*, the Kennedy team had legal consultants whose special assignment was to frame the "quarantine" edict (the ban on transporting so-called weapons to Cuba) in terms which would be as compatible as possible with principles of international law. This was advisable, the *Times* report adds, because the Russians are extremely sensitive to legal considerations.

Was this quarantine legal? A case can be made for it on the basis of precedent. In the past the technique of blockade – not confined only to offensive weapons – has upon occasion been used by one of the great powers to punish or reduce to submission a smaller power which has reneged on its debts or seized foreign enterprises. If such a blockade is not respected by the neutral nations, however, it may well result in acts of war. Was the United States legally entitled to invoke Paragraph 4, Article II of the United Nations Charter (prohibiting recourse to threats or to the use of force), and to accuse the Cuban Republic or the Soviet Union of having violated this Article? Even if we accept this premise, there is no article in the Charter authorizing a nation to be sole judge of which weapons in its opinion, constitute a "threat of force."

The truth is that the world we live in today differs fundamentally from the world envisaged by the framers of the Charter, and that the practical application of international law is only distantly related to the theory of international law.

The uneasy peace that reigns between the two great power blocs is founded on what is called a strategy of dissuasion; in other words, the permanent threat of the use of force. This military balance between the two blocs which the Charter did not foresee and to which Article 5 (the right of legitimate collective defense) lends a semblance of legality, is now accepted in Moscow and in Washington as permanent. To be sure, Mr. Khrushchev at regular intervals demands the evacuation of foreign military bases; but he is not surprised when, at equally regular intervals, Mr. Kennedy refuses to evacuate them. For Khrushchev himself demonstrated in Hungary that he would not tolerate the choosing of freedom by an East European nation which had been converted to Communism.

Beyond the Soviet zone proper, realism continues to prevail: Austria has been compelled to accept a kind of neutrality; Finland knows that her fate depends on Soviet good will rather than on American strength

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RAYMOND ARON'S *commentaries appear regularly in* Le Figaro *of Paris.*

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and she is pursuing a policy (at long last a happy one) of good neighborliness; and even Norway, which signed the North Atlantic Treaty, has refused to let foreign troops be stationed on her territory lest this "provoke" the Soviet Union. In other words, the smaller countries of Europe have learned through long experience that no great power will show any tolerance whatsoever toward a nation within the zone the former considers vital to its security, even if the latter has been officially recognized as a sovereign nation. The practical basis for America's action in the current crisis rests on this traditional and cynical prerogative of the major powers to impose limits on the action of the lesser powers. It is a right – or pseudo right – which no doubt antedated the United Nations Charter and which would have been invalidated by the Charter had the latter been applied. However, since peace today depends on the ability of each side to inflict massive reprisals on the other if the need arises, a concern for maintaining the balance should, *in the interest of peace*, take priority over our respect for formulae.

Outside the area where the two blocs conflict directly with one another, the expression of their rivalry is governed by a set of rules which is different but which is also alien to the spirit if not to the letter of the Charter. Subversion is a tolerated fact; the crossing of frontiers by troops of regulars is condemned. The organization and training of guerrilla troops to fight in the territory of a neighboring State was cited as an illustration in the definition of aggression drawn up by jurists between the two wars, and which even Soviet jurists retained in treaties signed by Moscow with neighboring countries (several of which have since ceased to exist). Nevertheless, for years Tunisia and Morocco allowed foreign troops to be stationed on their territory, these being at the time forces of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic which later became troops of the Algerian Republic. By contrast, even in the West public opinion was outraged by the French bombardment of Sakiet, although this bombardment was in reply to a violation of the law and was fairly easy to justify on legal grounds (which does not alter the fact that it was highly improper and ill-advised).



Neutrals

Will the Great Powers, particularly the United States, bow to the rule of non-use of regular troops in situations involving the allegiance of uncommitted nations? The American course of action in Cuba at least reveals the limits of this liberalism.

Although desiring to reduce the risk of war and the loss of life to a minimum, the US has made it clear that in the Western Hemisphere it will not hesitate, if necessary, to do what France and Great Britain were not authorized to do at Suez (and perhaps under the circumstances then prevailing, this prohibition was something of an expedient).

Certain uncommitted nations have been compelled by the Cuban crisis to recognize that they do not swing much weight in a showdown, and they harbor considerable bitterness as a result. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake if they failed to learn the obvious lesson. Realistic international law may grant lesser nations the right to choose their own form of government (though not to the extent of preventing the major powers from influencing this choice by subversion and counter-subversion); but it cannot grant these nations the right to acquire missile bases and to modify the balance of terror. At least for the time being, the United States will do its best to impose a radical distinction between the right to socialism and the right to thermonuclear weapons. Subversion is a legitimate tactic against socialism, but invasion is not. Where thermonuclear weapons are concerned, however, a quarantine and, as a last recourse, the use of force are legitimate.

During the Suez crisis, several of my American friends were carried away with enthusiasm because their President had placed considerations of international law above the ties of friendship. Should I now congratulate them because another President has, in the present crisis, placed their security above the law?

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Where's Civil Defense Now?

by Asher Brynes

When the Cuban crisis developed in the last week of October there were no illusions on either side: this might mean thermonuclear war. On November 18, after the worst was well over, the Office of Emergency Planning in Washington, which presides over the coordination of all non-military readiness efforts for dealing with the effects of nuclear attack, limited war, and the problems of post-attack rehabilitation on the federal level, issued a cheering statement. Said its Director: "I think we made more progress in preparedness in two weeks than in many months; more, probably, than in the two years before October 23." Another high official of the emergency planning agency added, by way of explanation, "We were playing for real."

What did this progress consist of? For one thing, detailed procedures have been planned to keep the nation supplied with folding money if the presses at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing in Washington should be demolished. A trainload – this could mean 4,000 tons – of paper currency has been shipped out to the Federal Reserve Banks all over the country. This special disaster reserve is adequate to provide the nation with a 30-month supply of cash in normal times. The member banks have been instructed, in turn, to warn apprehensive citizens against hoarding money of their own, for if it should be incinerated the government would be unable to help them. If, on the other hand, the bank in which the citizen deposits his money is incinerated, and if he survives, and if he has a record of his account, he will be reimbursed. (The government's policy provides sharing of war losses.)

But even if the money survives, will the government (without faith in which the money will rapidly become worthless), survive too? When the Cuban crisis broke the Office of Emergency Planning already knew that the succession in government agencies – who takes the place of the top man in case of trouble, then of his deputy, and next the understrapper and so on down the line – had not been developed with uniformity in all departments, nor in sufficient depth. Despite efforts to solve it, the problem persisted. Within 48 hours after the first news of the crisis, it was solved. Under the direction of the Emergency Office 20 agencies worked out lines of leadership succession to a depth of 12 ranks.

So the US will have money, and a government to back it. But what of the citizenry who are supposed to spend the money? Will they survive in sufficient numbers to transact business in anything like the usual way? The recent report on the operations of the Office of Emergency Planning is silent about such matters, despite the fact that the Director who established the Agency said last year, "Without shelter, there is no civil defense."

The current Shelter Survey and Marking Program was initiated more than a year ago, in August, 1961. Its objective was to locate and mark "those facilities which will afford adequate protection (against fallout) without modification. Preliminary estimates indicate that suitable shelter will be found for about one-fourth of our population, or 50 million people." Last year's announcement went on to say that "those buildings that do not meet federal specifications but which do show the possibility of meeting them through modification will be recorded as potential shelters."

What has happened since then? Since special attention has been devoted to the nation's capital, the story there is probably better than elsewhere in the country. The capital's Fallout Shelter Space Survey got under way in October, 1961. The Director of Operations of the Office of Civil Defense then announced: "This is the real thing. We're getting into this right away. We're trying to have our initial identification work done throughout all the country by April and have all space we find marked by July [1962]." The District of Columbia was used as a training ground for experts in shelter finding and marking, who were to train thousands of others how to find and mark shelter space throughout the nation. The District Civil Defense Director declared that the first phase of the survey, location of usable space, would be completed on December 1, the day the official survey of the rest of the nation began.

The opening of the first public fallout shelter in Washington was delayed, however, until October 12, 1962 – 10 long months later. It was located in a junior high school, and had a maximum capacity of 345 persons. When reporters inquired about the delay – the District of Columbia is one of 22 key cities in the nation which is now being provided with shelter supplies under a special accelerated program of the Defense Department – local civil defense officials responded with tales of trouble. They had started to stock some of the capital's model shelters last spring, but this activity had to be halted abruptly when it was learned that the plastic bags, provided by the Defense Department for use as liners for water drums, leaked. The

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leaky containers were given to the District school system for utilization as air raid shelter toilets. Now steel drums instead of fiberboard containers are being purchased for water storage. Meanwhile, some 3 million pounds of the wheat biscuit to be used for survival rations had backed up in a Navy warehouse.

According to the local Civil Defense director it will take until June of next year, at the very earliest, to complete the stocking of the buildings officially approved for use as shelters. These are the structures that provide a protective factor of 100 against radiation from fallout. But only 58 of the District's school buildings so qualify. The larger proportion, 112 in all, or two-thirds of the city's schools, do not. To accommodate them a special civil defense message dated October 30 was issued, reducing the fallout protection factor standard from 100 to 40 in school shelter areas.

Under the federal rules such subgrade shelters are ineligible for free civil defense supplies from the Department of Defense. And the District does not have any budgeted funds for the purchase of these things. In this dilemma the Deputy Superintendent of Schools in charge of sheltering the children in the system suggested that the money be raised by bake sales, school plays and similar projects.

Under the impact of the Cuban crisis, however, the head of the school system sent out a circular letter to all parents informing them that they would be asked to provide the money for shelter supplies. The cost if the supplies were bought commercially, was estimated at $9 for each child. As a consequence most of the District's children will be sheltered, under this latest scheme, in substandard areas providing about 40 percent of the approved protection factor – and their parents will have to pay for the privilege.

The school principals whose buildings happened to be substandard were told, as part of the same scheme of action in the Cuban crisis, that it was their responsibility to collect the $9 from each pupil and buy the supplies. A week later, with the crisis in abeyance, the *Washington Star* assigned a reporter to make a survey of the results. The Congress of Parents and Teachers in the District had rejected this plan completely. Money for supplies, it said in an official notice, "is not a parental responsibility and is clearly the responsibility of the city government. Individual school principals were as emphatic. "There is nothing we can do," said one. "Where would we ever get that kind of money." Another refused to discuss the plan: "This thing is a mess. It defies the imagination. We've been given a lot of responsibility but no authority." And there were, of course, those who appointed committees which were to report to other committees which were, finally, to report their suggested solutions of the difficulty to some committee of last resort.

A national survey by the Office of Civil Defense in the Pentagon revealed at this time that 60 million shelter spaces had been "identified" throughout the country. But only the OCD – and perhaps the owners or caretakers of the buildings inspected – know where the spaces are. Only 700,000 shelter spaces have been *marked* in all states, and of these some 200,000 are stocked with essential supplies. The latter are, of course, the only adequate public fallout shelter spaces in existence today. In contemplating this situation it may be well to remember that shelter enthusiasts like Dr. Ralph Lapp provide themselves and their families with *two* private shelters – one close by, in which to wait out the effects of a nuclear detonation which may occur within 15 minutes of warning time or less; and another, out in the suburbs, which can be reached in about a half hour. This latter shelter, the wise individual's fortress against the foolishness of mankind, is stocked with six months' supplies.

Such is the ideal in these matters. In the meantime, most people seem willing to settle the issue for very much less. The last Congress cut 83 percent off the budget request of the Office of Civil Defense, after extensive polling in the constituencies. These Congressional polls showed that there was not a single district among those surveyed in which majority support for the Administration's modest fallout shelter program existed. Indeed, two-thirds of those asked were in opposition; only one-third favored it or had no opinion.

Civil defense officials have reported much telephoning at the height of the crisis, and many requests for pamphlet materials, but practically no action of a substantial kind. This latter-day flurry over shelters moved few bricks, literally or figuratively, and mixed no mortar. One advertisement for shelter supplies dealt with distilled water in cartons of six half-gallon bottles – good for fallout shelters . . . or steam irons.

Finally, one important thing has passed unnoticed in the storm of discussion that is worth reflecting upon. An implicit threat of war was made by the United States at the beginning of the Cuba crisis to forestall Soviet retaliation elsewhere. It was understood, *and apparently believed* by the USSR. Now this should not have happened, according to the theories of Herman Kahn and the other mathematical strategists: Only when Americans were sheltered against the consequences of a nuclear response, according to this dogma, would the threat to use atomic weapons have been *credible*. Such theoretical reasonings have supplied the intellectual basis for all of the large-scale programs of fallout sheltering, both those that would cost a few billions and those that would require the expenditure of as much as $12 to $15 billion. Now that this ambitious rationale is in doubt, it seems unlikely that the old fallout shelter programs will be revived.

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Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Latin America

by Louis L. Wiznitzer

Peking is engaged in a new effort to swing leftist opinion in Latin America away from Khrushchev's policy of economic competition and limited military action, toward Mao Tse-tung's view that revolution must be pushed now and at any cost. The Soviet agreement to withdraw missiles from Cuba has been branded the "Red Munich" by the Chinese, who appear to be forcing a showdown with the Russians: Titoism or Maoism; peaceful coexistence plus financial and technical aid to neutrals, or endorsement of revolutions everywhere, even at the risk of provoking nuclear war.

The Russians have had the advantage of several Soviet embassies in Latin America (Montevideo, Rio, Mexico City), and long experience. The Chinese started their penetration in 1956, by the establishment of friendship societies in several Latin American countries. They have branches of their *Hsinua News* in Rio, Havana, Buenos Aires and other cities. In 1958, 37 Latin American delegations went to Peking; in 1960, 168 went. The Chinese-Latin American Friendship Association, set up in March, 1960, in Peking, is in charge of disseminating Chinese views throughout Latin America. The China-Brazil Friendship Soviet in Rio is managed by Adao Perreira Nunes and Rachel Cossoy, quite independently of the local Communist Party.

In Brazil, Equador, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, rank-and-file Communists are impatient with Khrushchev's "gradual" methods, which they call *operacion durmiente* (lying in a railway sleeper). One of the most dramatic results of the Sino-Soviet rift has been the split in Brazil. Five senior members left the party a year ago and founded their own "Brazilian Communist Party" (as opposed to the "Communist Party of Brazil") under the leadership of Mauricio Gribois, Joao Amazonas, Guido Enes and Manuel Ferreira. Since last March, *Novos Rumos* (pro-Soviet weekly of the orthodox Communists) and *Classe Operaria* (monthly publication of the pro-Chinese dissidents) have engaged in a violent polemic. While the pro-Soviet party has fought within the student organization for a "popular front" of progressive, Christian-Socialist and other students, the pro-Chinese have denounced all such alliances and urged the students to take to the country and help train the peasants for guerrilla warfare. *Novos Rumos* calls this policy "irresponsible," "trotzkite." *Classe Operaria* answers by calling the pro-Soviets "instruments of the bourgeoisie" and "appeasers." *Novos Rumos* had persistently backed Brazil's President Goulart, though with reservations. *Classe Operaria* violently denounces Goulart as a "traitor" of the workers and peasants. Both publications quote Marx, Engels and Lenin as proof.

Novos Rumos finds in the Communist Holy Books warnings against bellicose adventures and dogmatism. *Classe Operaria* unearths warnings against appeasing the bourgeoisie and imperialism. In its September issue, *Classe Operaria* quotes Lenin: "We true socialists are convinced that the working class can, through revolutionary propaganda, be led to fight the regime immediately. We don't want to wait for objective circumstances to open eyes and inspire the proletarians. We prefer to accelerate the process . . ." And in a column, it says: "At a time when in our country opportunists renounce the Marxist-Leninist principle of international proletarianism and present a reformist program, the experience of the First International is of an enormous help to us, true revolutionary Communists."

Then, late August, a third Communist publication called "LIGA" appeared. It is under the management of Francisco Juliao, founder and leader of the Brazilian "Peasant Leagues." Juliao is not a member of either of the other Communist parties, but is an outspoken admirer of Mao Tse-tung. He has visited Peking twice and enthusiastically supports his personal friend Fidel Castro (who is strongly suspected of helping to finance Juliao's movement). In a violent argument with Gicondo Dias, member of the Pro-Soviet Communist Party, Juliao quoted Tsendenbal, leader of the Mongolian Communist Party, as follows: "Our country switched directly from a feudal regime to socialism, without going through an intermediate capitalistic phase. Some bourgeois sociologists believe that the construction of socialism in a country that has not yet traversed the capitalistic phase contradicts Marxist theory. But is it really so? History is full of examples of countries having . . . leaped directly to a more advanced phase of social development." As for an alliance with the national *bourgeoisie* (promoted by the Brazilian pro-Soviet Communists), Juliao quotes the Second Havana Declaration: "In the present historic circumstances of Latin America the national bourgeoisie *cannot* lead the anti-feudal and anti-imperialistic struggle. Even when

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its interests clash with Yankee imperialism, the national bourgeoisie is paralyzed with fear of a social revolution and of the roar of the oppressed classes."

Novos Rumos answered Juliao in its August 17 issue: "The point is not to quote texts dogmatically and narrowly, no matter how right they may be. We Brazilian Communists have for a long time made just such a mistake. We would expect our socialist ally to contribute to creative thinking rather than espouse "dogmatism." *Novos Rumos* describes Juliao as "ultra-leftist" and denies flatly that the time has come for a socialist revolution in Brazil.

Everywhere in Latin America, most of the rank-and-file revolutionaries feel closer to the Chinese revolution than to the Russians. They have no patience with "peaceful coexistence" or "thaws." At the conference of the 81 Communist parties held in Moscow in December, 1960, all of Europe's Communist parties (with the exception of Albania) endorsed Khrushchev's views, however reluctantly in some instances. But the Asian and Latin American delegates showed open sympathy for Mao's aggressive line.

They are aware that the Cuban, Egyptian and Algerian revolutions were made without Communist help and sometimes against the advice of the Communists. They know that the Chinese revolution succeeded without Stalin's support. Similarly, they know that in Latin America Moscow (and Latin Americans trained there) often supports strategies which promote Soviet international policy rather than strategies designed to bring the Communist Party of Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, etc. closer to power. In 1960, for example, the Brazilian Communist Party, upon orders from Moscow, reversed itself and backed Janio Quadros for President. Marechal Lott, whom the Brazilian Communists had previously backed for the Presidency, would have been more lenient to Communists in Brazil. But Quadros, while promising to crack down on the Brazilian Communists, had proposed to re-establish diplomatic relations with Moscow, which Lott had not.

In the Caribbean too there appears to have been a conflict between Russian and Cuban objectives; here too the Chinese have been able to take the part of the Cubans, acting as the "true" allies of the Revolution. Fidel Castro's expulsion of Escalante, the number two man of the Cuban Communist Party (he is now in Prague) and Castro's speech on March 26 against "secularism" (by which he meant the attempt by veteran Communists to dominate the mass organizations) was interpreted in Latin American Communist circles (though not, admittedly, in the US State Department) as pro-Chinese. Ch'en Yi sent Fidel Castro a message of comradely support, and Fidel's speech was published all over China. Some of Fidel's close advisers have long been known to lean towards Chinese policies, or to be "on the left" of the Communists. They include Che Guevarra, whose wife and children have just left for Peking; Augusto Martinez Santes, minister of Labor; William Galvez, chief of staff of the army.

The Russians have mistrusted Fidel's volatile and versatile temperament and have usually been cautious not to bind themselves to his government lest they be drawn by his recklessness into war. They attempted, through the Cuban Communist Party, to gain control over Fidel's government in order to make Cuba an obedient instrument of Soviet foreign policy. They failed. As viewed in Latin American leftist circles, Fidel's foreign policy in the past year has been an attempt to blackmail the Russians by threatening "to go Chinese." During recent negotiations in Havana with Mikoyan and U Thant, Fidel received strong and open support from China and Albania. Peking has encouraged him to hold out for the evacuation of Guantanamo Bay. By refusing to yield to Soviet pressure, Castro exposes the Soviets in front of Latin American Communists as being "soft on imperialism."

On the other hand, the Chinese can hardly "carry" Cuba economically (they haven't enough oil to keep Castro going, among other things), so that the Cubans are unlikely to make an open break with the Soviets.

How far the Chinese penetration can go nobody is sure. If the recent reports from Warsaw are correct, the downing of the American U-2 over Cuba last month was the work of Chinese technicians operating the Russian anti-aircraft missiles. Even if the reports are not true, the fact that the Poles regard them as plausible suggests that the Sino-Soviet conflict has gone farther than most imagine.

Whatever the fate of the Cubans, and whatever the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict elsewhere, the struggle for ascendency in out-of-power Communist parties around the world is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Wherever militant local Communists feel that Moscow is not supporting them avidly enough, they are likely to turn to the Chinese for help. And they are likely to get it.

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More than Keynes

by Benjamin Caplan and Harald Malmgren

Reading *The New Republic* symposium, *Time for a Keynes*, we confess to a feeling of disappointment. We had expected a critique of contemporary ideas, a call for new information, and suggestions where a new Keynes might begin. The articles were singularly disappointing in this respect, consisting mainly of commentaries on what the economy looks like viewed through Keynesian spectacles. There is undoubtedly a great deal more to be done about putting many Keynesian principles into action in public policy, as Alvin Hansen and John P. Lewis pointed out.

It is, however, not enough to say that demand is deficient – which is clearly true – and that therefore fiscal policy should make up the gap. This is no more than an arithmetical truism. The basic question is: Why is demand deficient? Why has the economy faltered since the mid-fifties? It is on this point that the symposium failed to make any significant contribution.

It may be said that this question is interesting but not really relevant. For if, as Walter Heller pointed out, the gap between the potential Gross National Product (at full employment) and the current GNP is $30 billion, then all that is necessary is to increase purchasing power by enough (taking due account of the multiplier and the induced effects on investment) to make up the deficiency. Alas, the world is not so simple or else we would have been living in a Keynesian paradise long before this. For how much additional purchasing power will be "enough" depends on the forecast of what private demand will do. Our experience with forecasting is not that encouraging (*vide*, the $570 billion GNP forecast for 1962 by the Council of Economic Advisers compared with a now-expected GNP of only $555 billion). Fiscal policy cannot be regulated at will.

What is wrong? Why is demand deficient? We do not have the answer. But we share with Helen Hill Miller what we believe is her feeling that the standard Keynesian categories are inadequate to diagnose the trends in the economy since the mid-fifties. What is needed is a meta-Keynesian approach. At this point, we can only raise some basic questions.

The general facts are familiar enough. Since 1947 the consumer behaved with exemplary Keynesian virtue and predictability, spending about 93 percent of whatever disposable dollars he can lay his hands on. But since the mid-fifties private demand has nevertheless been lagging, primarily because of a failure of private investment to perform as it had during 1947-57.

Yet to say that there has been a failure of private investment is not wholly accurate. It is true that investmen in plant and equipment has failed to grow since the mid-fifties. In 1957, such expenditure reached a postwar peak, slightly under $37 billion. It did not return to this level until 1962, when the forecast is slightly over $37 billion. Gross private domestic investment including housing and inventories has risen since 1957, but less rapidly than the Gross National Product.

Judged by absolute standards, the level of private investment is quite impressive. The failure of private investment is not a failure to grow but a failure to grow enough to maintain its share of the GNP.

This lag in investment requires explanation. The role of fiscal policy (*e.g.* deficits and surpluses in the federal budget) depends on the diagnosis. At least two explanations are possible. The popular explanation is that after a postwar boom in capital investment some let down in investment was inevitable, since like all capital booms, the tendency was to create excess capacity. The remarkable fact is not that there was a let down but that the let down was so light, unlike the disastrous experience after the capital boom of the Twenties. On this line of reasoning, what we need to do is exercise patience until we grow up to our productive capacity. The task of fiscal policy is then clear – to fill the gap until investment expands again.

The other less widely discussed explanation recognizes the validity of the "postwar boom" argument but makes a more fundamental point. This explanation assumes that a structural change is taking place in the role which private capital plays in our economy. The evidence, as yet fragmentary but suggestive, comes from the long-run trend in capital-output ratios. (This ratio measures the amount of capital required per dollar of output.) The remarkable fact is that this ratio has declined significantly since the Twenties. Estimates of the Council of Economic Advisers show that the capital-output ratio for business declined from 2.3 (*i.e.*, $2.30 of capital to $1.00 of output) in 1929, the starting point of the series, to about 1.8 in the postwar period. This is a decline of over one-fifth. John Kendrick's data, quoted by Moses Abramovitz, shows a decline in the growth of capital requirements and an increase in the

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rate of growth of output per man hour. Klein and Kosobud using different data have found that the capital-output ratio has declined one-third of one percent semi-annually since 1900. If this trend were to continue indefinitely, we might have a future of capitalism without capital. (This trend is ironic in view of the apocalyptic visions of Marx, who prophesied the destruction of capitalism because of its supposed tendency toward the excessive accumulation of capital.)

Such a projection of capitalism without capital is, of course, far too simple, and its importance lies in exposing the trend rather than the final position we might hypothetically and absurdly reach. What it emphasizes is the strong possibility that we now have reached a stage where technological development is, or is becoming, so productive that we need less and less increase in capital to maintain our increase in productivity per man hour. Automation and new scientific processes appear to signify that we are in a third industrial revolution.

We say that there is a possibility that private capital will continue to decline in relative importance as it already has in the postwar period. A more affirmative statement is not possible without studies of a kind that have not been made of the impact of new technology on the capital needs of major industries.

But the matter is not simply an apparent decline in the strength of the private sector because of technological gains. What is also important is the economy's apparent inability to utilize fully the capital in existence and the labor available. Some consideration has been given to the possibility of structural unemployment of labor in public discussions. The question has been put, in other words, as to whether much of the labor unemployed is tied by skill and location to declining industries. An alternative question is whether there is structural unemployment of capital. Labor, to a considerable extent, is flexible. Plant and equipment, on the other hand, are often quite inflexible. If we find ourselves with too much automobile capacity or steel capacity, we are stuck with it until demand catches up or some of the equipment becomes too old to run economically. The structural unemployment of capital would exist even in a context of full employment of labor, *e.g.* steel, coal, oil, railroads.

What could have caused structural unemployment of capital? Much of it may be a consequence of defensive investment in large oligopolistic industries, each firm investing more and more to ensure that it maintains its share of the market in the face of increased investment by its competitors. Much of it is a result of the considerable gains in production resulting from small increases in capital investment in the form of control processes or automation. A capital-saving as well as a labor-saving technology results in much idle capacity. Much of it may also be attributable to the ability of business to finance itself largely from the internal flow of funds, such as depreciation and undistributed profits. This restricts the flow of capital between industries.

Looking at the economy from the side of investment then, asking ourselves what private investment can be expected to do for us in the next few years and what kinds of structural unemployment of capital we may expect, we believe that a fresh approach to economic thinking is required. The Keynesian approach (and Keynes himself argued this) is a short-run approach primarily concerned with the level of demand and the level of investment. If we put ourselves in a state of mind to look beyond cyclical policy, however, and think in terms of the trend of *growth*, we may have to concern ourselves not with the level of investment, but with the pattern of investment. Not with *how much* (filling any shortage with public investment), but with *what kind*. In this connection we found the views of Simon Kuznets pertinent. Perhaps those economists who concentrate on the level of demand required to reach some hypothetical level of employment and output overlook the major long-run problems. Thinking about the level of demand in an almost obsessive way, they carefully balance America's annual private and public budgets, or national income accounts, in good Keynesian accounting fashion. This bookkeeping system has a great many merits, but it can cope only with *levels* of expenditure and investment, not *kinds*.

What we need is a new Keynes to analyze the pattern of investment and its effect on the need for labor and on the rate of growth of the economy. What we want to be able to discuss are the sectors or industries which can help us most in the future, in the way that railroads, steel, and other key industries served us in the past. We have to think beyond the short business cycle and beyond the balancing of national books.

Since 1937 there has been a fascination with the mechanics of our economic system and little interest in the sources of its energy. A meta-Keynesian approach would have to deal with causes in a much more open way. If our surmises are correct – if the demand for business capital is in a long-term relative decline and if there is a serious problem with structural misallocation of capital – this opens an entirely new perspective for public policy. The question is no longer whether fiscal policy can offset a temporary (five- or ten years) gap in demand, but how we can restructure our economy, so that new permanent sources of demand may be found. In this task fiscal policy plays a major role, but by no means the only role. This perspective opens up new and exciting possibilities. It would be a truly New Frontier, rather than a bringing up-to-date of the now old New Deal.

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The Great Burroughs Affair

by John Wain

Naked Lunch belongs to that very large category of books, from Macpherson's *Ossian* to *Peyton Place*, whose interest lies not in their own qualities but in the reception given to them in their own time. In itself, *Naked Lunch* is of very small significance. It consists of a prolonged scream of hatred and disgust, an effort to keep the reader's nose down in the mud for

Naked Lunch
by William S. Burroughs
(Grove; $6)

250 pages. Before reading it I had heard it described as pornography, but this is not the case. The object of pornographic writing is to flood the reader's mind with lust, and lust is at any rate a positive thing to the extent that none of us would exist without it. A pornographic novel is, in however backhanded a way, on the side of something describable as life.

Naked Lunch, by contrast, is unreservedly on the side of death. It seeks to flood the reader's mind not with images of sexual desire but with images of pain, illness, cruelty and corruption.

This is not in fact a very difficult thing to do, since all that is necessary is to brood on everything capable of arousing disgust and revulsion, let the images well up, and dash them down onto the paper. A book like *Naked Lunch* requires far less talent in the writer, and for that matter less intelligence in the reader, than the humblest magazine story or circulating-library novel. From the literary point of view, it is the merest trash, not worth a second glance.

What is worth a glance, however, is the respectful attitude that some well-known writers and critics have shown towards it. Some of the tributes on the wrapper are entirely routine and unsurprising; to find Norman Mailer, for instance, solemnly declaring that this is "a book of beauty, great difficulty, and maniacally exquisite insight," will startle no one, since Mailer has in recent years worked himself round to a position which makes it impossible for him to apply normal values to literature. Kerouac's confident invoking of Swift, Rabelais and Sterne will also pass without comment, since he has given no indication that he knows these writers except as names to be bandied about. E. S. Seldon, on the other hand, a name not previously known to me but evidently well-known enough to be quoted in a blurb, seems to write like a literate man, and his verdict that "Burroughs is a superb writer, and *Naked Lunch* a novel of revolt in the best late-modern sense," pulls one up. It sounds, on the surface at any rate, as if it ought to mean something.

What in fact do we understand by a "novel of revolt" in "the best late-modern sense"? To begin with, such a book would have to belong to the anti-art movement. Secondly, it would have to deal with characters whose lives are largely devoted to escaping from normal day-to-day living, with its pleasures and responsibilities, and achieving, with the aid of drugs and other stimuli, a more or less permanent state of abnormality, where the monstrous becomes the habitual. Thirdly, it would have to be written out of a mood of disgust and hostility. Fourthly, it would have to be urban in atmosphere, saturated with the details of megalopolis.

All these tendencies can be found in writers who were well under way by 1910 – in Alfred Jarry, for example. After 1918 the method was very quickly brought to full development, and the only way of carrying it any further was to increase the element of nausea. The impulse behind anti-art, from Dada manifestos to Action Painting, has always been two-fold. Part of the thrust was towards truthfulness and a closer grip on reality. Conventional art, which always admitted a degree of stylization, tended to put reality at a distance, whereas (it was claimed) anti-art had the immediacy of something actually happening; it was not "culture." Naturally this was closely allied with the second objective, which was to shock and startle, to insult, to open people's eyes by affronting them. What Mr. Selden would call "late-modern" is characterized by nothing new except that it digs deeper for its mud, and crushes out more ruthlessly any spark of lyricism or positiveness. Where genuine imaginative writing increases the sensitiveness of the minds exposed to it, leading them on to a wider and deeper range of feelings, writing of this kind makes the mind blunt and callow. Anyone who really accepted its values, as opposed to pretending to accept them as part of some modish parade, would be the enemy not only of art but of the human race.

The idea seems to have got about that Burroughs is the same kind of writer as Henry Miller; indeed, I have seen it stated several times that *Naked Lunch* is, so to speak, Miller's *Tropics* carried a stage further. In fact, they are writers of entirely opposite tendency. Miller is an affirmative writer. He preaches incessantly, and his "message," boiled down to its essentials, is that happiness is attainable by anyone who sheds his responsibilities and lives by impulse, never doing anything that he doesn't feel exactly like doing at that moment. The "I" of Henry Miller's writings, who may or may not bear any close relationship to the author, is a figure who has achieved complete liberation from the hampering ties of daily life, and as a result has broken through into a dimension where exist-

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ence seems to comprise nothing but epiphanies. "This is the first day of my life. . . . I bless the world, every inch of it, every living atom, and it is all alive." And so forth. Just how sound this is, as a guide to the seeker after happiness, is open to question. There are so many things you can't do without accepting responsibility; an acceptance like that made by the "I" of Miller's fantasies is based on an enormous refusal – a refusal of family relationships, a refusal of anything stable and fixed, and even – since it prevents one from holding down a job – a refusal of skill. What Miller offers is attractive and interesting on a superficial level; as soon as one begins to think seriously about it, the emptiness and weariness come into focus. At a certain stage of adolescence, no doubt, it is pleasant for a boy to picture himself as having endlessly to do with women yet always successfully refusing to take emotional responsibility for any particular one. But to remain in that state is to remain in adolescence, a prey to the melancholy and instability of adolescence as well as a beneficiary of its energy and heightened emotions.

Still, if we take him on the half-serious level on which he deserves to be taken, Miller has something to offer, and that something is an affirmation. He is a great celebrator. *The Air-Conditioned Nightmare*, for instance, is full of abuse of American life, but its final effect, when you have shut the book and allowed it to sink in a day or two, is one of praise. Miller is an enjoyer; wherever he goes he finds something to enjoy, even if it is only the pleasure of hurling insults at things he finds hateful. He isn't depressed; he hurls the insults with the abandon of a schoolboy shying at coconuts. America threatened him, to begin with, because it was home, and home meant (however distantly) responsibility and authority:

> "When I came up on deck to catch my first glimpse of the shore line I was disappointed. Not only disappointed, I might say, but actually saddened. The American coast looked bleak and uninviting to me. I didn't like the look of the American house; there is something cold, austere, something barren and chill, about the architecture of the American home. It was *home*, with all the ugly, evil, sinister connotations which the word contains for a restless soul. There was a frigid, moral aspect to it which chilled me to the bone."

After this unpromising start, however, America swallows him up in her vast landscape, and he begins to enjoy himself. With time off every now and then for howls of execration, the rest of the book is a celebration. It isn't as good as *The Colossus of Maroussi*, but it's good, because Miller is always good when he can praise anything. In however addlepated a way, he loves life. Though his recipe for happiness is one that for any thoughtful person just wouldn't work, nevertheless happiness is what he wants.

What is more, Miller has developed a style that is very well fitted for this continual act of celebration. He writes a hurrying, turbulent prose that gives the impression of complete spontaneity, but only the most naïve reader will imagine that such prose can be produced without a great deal of hard work. The rhythms never get out of hand, the pauses are varied with considerable skill, and the words are chosen with great effectiveness. If this is anti-art, it is at least not anti-craft. George Orwell, in his classic essay on Miller ("Inside the Whale," 1940) declared that Miller's books "give you an idea of what can still be done, even at this late date, with English prose. In them, English is treated as a spoken language, but spoken *without fear, i.e.* without fear of rhetoric or of the unusual or poetical word. The adjective has come back, after its ten years' exile. It is a flowing, swelling prose, a prose with rhythms in it, something quite different from the flat cautious statements and snack bar dialects that are now in fashion."

Like most English people of my generation, I first heard of Miller through Orwell's essay, and when, some years later, I at last got hold of his books, I found that whereas Orwell had completely misled me about the scope and nature of Miller's work, he had prepared me very well for the style. Miller is a very contagious writer: after reading him for an hour or so, you find that if you sit down to write it is difficult not to produce something that sounds like an imitation of him. Orwell, in that same essay, has some amusing examples, passages where he has quite unconsciously deserted his own steel-grey, incisive prose for something rather like pastiche of Miller. For instance: "What is he accepting? In the first place, not America, but the ancient bone-heap of Europe, where every grain of soil has passed through innumerable human bodies." That sentence is not in Orwell's idiom but in Miller's – though, it is fair to add, Miller would have put it rather better. Orwell has been drawn into rhetoric against his better judgment, because Miller makes rhetoric seem easy and attractive. Likewise when he writes, a few pages later, "He is fiddling while Rome is burning, and, unlike the enormous majority of people who do this, fiddling with his face towards the flames," we recognize once again the pull towards rhetoric – a much stronger tribute to Miller's gifts than the rather guarded, give-and-take-away praise which he accords him.

Miller, then, is contagious because he is an enjoyer. The "freedom" he proclaims would in practice turn out to be self-defeating, but at least it is a freedom to enjoy life. Burroughs, by contrast, belongs more to the tradition of Celine. He doesn't want to enjoy himself and he doesn't want us to, either. Imagine him looking at a landscape and getting anything out of it! The nearest he gets to a description of pleasure, of anybody doing anything because they *liked* it, is (at the worst) in his obsessive descriptions of fearful sadistic violence and (at the best) in a passage like:

> "Iris – half Chinese and half Negro – addicted to dihy-dro-oxy-heroin – takes a shot every fifteen minutes to which end she leaves droppers and needles sticking out all over her. The needles rust in her flesh, which, here and there, has grown completely over a joint to form a smooth green brown wen. On the table in front of her is a samovar of tea and a twenty-pound hamper of brown sugar. No one has ever seen her eat anything else. It is only just before a shot that she hears what anyone says or talks herself."

The only writer of any talent of whom

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Burroughs occasionally manages to remind one is the Marquis de Sade; but if one turns to the pages of Sade after *Naked Lunch* the resemblance soon fades, since Sade, however degenerate he can be at times, has always some saving wit and irony. Burroughs takes himself with a complete, owlish seriousness; indeed, in his opening section he seems, as far as one can make out through the pea-soup fog of his prose, to be offering the book as some kind of tract against drug addiction. "*The junk virus is public health problem number one of the world to-day.* Since *Naked Lunch* treats this health problem, it is necessarily brutal, obscene and disgusting. Sickness is often repulsive details not for weak stomachs." The claim is, of course, balderdash, since the only effect of the flood of writing which takes the junkie or hipster as its central theme is to romanticize those unfortunates, as Byron and the "Byronists" romanticized a certain kind of romantic self-pity and caused it to spread throughout the world.

Altogether, *Naked Lunch* offers a very interesting field for speculation, both pathological and sociological. No lover of medical text-books on deformity should miss it. The rest of us, however, can afford to spend our six dollars on something else.

Memoirs of a Propagandist

by Gerald W. Johnson

It may be plausibly argued that the strength and the weakness, the tragedy and the comedy, the triumph and the defeat of Upton Sinclair all stem from the capacity he shares with the Red Queen who told Alice, "Sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."

In the case of Sinclair, however, it happened repeatedly, perhaps every second or third day, that one of his six turned out to be not impossible, but profoundly true. When he believed, he believed wholeheartedly, and a man who believes wholeheartedly in one truth can believe five bits of nonsense and still make an impression upon the world; for the dismal fact is that not many of us can now believe wholeheartedly in anything.

The Autobiography of Upton Sinclair
(Harcourt, Brace & World; $6.95)

At the age of 84 the propagandist relates his own story, but with a highly important *caveat* inserted in the preface. He thinks that if he told the story with complete seriousness the modern generation would be bewildered. Therefore he treats it lightly, and the modern generation may even be more bewildered because this is not the Upton Sinclair they have found in his earlier works. His own explanation is, "I was impatient of every form of human vanity and stupidity, and if I have become less so with the passage of the years, it has been merely to spare my digestion."

But in sparing his digestion he has made this book highly readable. It sparkles. A multitude of critics will instantly rise up to assert, "Now you are asking *us* to believe the impossible," but it is true. It is not a gay book. The autobiography of any man who has warred against contemporary society is bound to be profoundly tragic, and this one is no exception. But in his old age Sinclair has realized to what a large extent it was tragi-comedy, and he consistently emphasizes the humorous element, although without denying the tragic.

The result is a book full of laughter and tears, which is to say, a book of unflagging interest. But it is more. It is the record of a personality far more important, historically, than many Americans realize.

Upton Sinclair is of the American type most brilliantly exemplified by Jefferson, the two Roosevelts and, possibly, Kennedy – he was a traitor to his class. The Sinclairs were Navy people; a great-grandfather fought in the war of 1812, a grandfather commanded one of Perry's ships on the expedition to Japan; on his mother's side he was related to the Blands, of Virginia, and an uncle founded the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, still a financial giant. But his paternal grandfather served the Confederacy, was killed in the Civil War, and the family fortune was destroyed. His father was an alcoholic – sufficient explana-

A Poem on the Nuclear War, from Pompeii

The August blackberries harden and sour.
Their vines rattle at a breath of volcanic dust
Through the portico of Juppiter Sator.

Plucked juicy from broken stone, the fruits suggest
A semblance of cycle. The principle could not be
More apparent; in the wreck of the past,

In the dead fusion of marble and lava, the seed
Of new greenness begins. But the berries sour on my mouth.
Hot wind and cinder sun have frayed

The vines and wizened the sweetness of the berries' growth.
Not only Pompeii, but all of Europe seems
To drowse here, dazed in the sun towards death.

It is a time of stopped time, when ruins
Of the human mind are tangled with stunted fruit
Of the future. A new sun blots Vesuvius –
Of earth and sky, the old but the new destroyer.

Richard Tillinghast

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tion of the fact that Sinclair has always been a teetotaler – and his mother, although an Episcopalian, was of the puritanical type, a foe even of tea and coffee. The boy alternated between the slums and luxury. In his native Baltimore he became acquainted with the most exclusive social circles, and in New York, during his father's frequent binges, he met the dregs.

The resultant of these forces was a rebel; and because he was endowed with fabulous energy and utter fearlessness he became a spectacular rebel. He developed into one of the most prolific and possibly one of the greatest writers this country has ever produced – not a great novelist, nor a great philosopher, but a propagandist miles above Thomas Paine and Henry George, and not far below Aquinas, Erasmus and Voltaire. Propagandists are kittle cattle; critics and historians have never known how to classify them. Zola couldn't write, but he wrecked a social order. Socrates never wrote at all, but he wrecked a world. Upton Sinclair wrote a novel that ran to eleven volumes, which is enough to damn him in the eyes of every *arbiter elegantiarum*, but he has shaped the thinking of millions who never heard of any other American writer. Hence his story is more than merely entertainment; it is a historical document.

Rival Strategies of Peace

by Arthur I. Waskow

The defense industry has become less and less the producer of hardware and more and more the creator of ideas; the new "peace industry" is a further development in the same direction. "Peace strategies," like their military counterparts, are beginning to compete with each other.

One of the major distinctions among them is whether they emphasize the creation of a stable world or the creation of an unstable world in which intense conflict continues but in which war does not take place. This difference does not fit into the usual sterile distinctions that are made between the unilateralist and the multilateralist, the "pacifist" and the "peace-concerned." Often the best expression of the difference is whether the researcher focuses on "reducing international tensions" or "increasing non-military competition."

Preventing World War III: Some Proposals.
Edited by Quincy Wright, William M. Evan and Morton Deutsch.
(Simon and Schuster; $6.95)

The emphasis on "conflict" in *Preventing World War III* takes a variety of forms. David Riesman describes how American fat cats could kill Communist lean cats by stuffing them to death with cream, in a 1947 essay, "The Nylon War," which will never go stale. Amitai Etzioni, a Columbia sociologist, argues that competition in space may lead to war because it is easy for a nation to see when it is losing, but that competition in developing the under-developed world – because it would involve a number of differently scored "races" and "matches" – would allow conflict to be carried on without resort to war. Thomas Schelling, the Harvard economist, argues for the creation of special Soviet and American forces, each capable of overseeing the crash disarmament of the other side in a great world crisis when the choice might be between total war and instant disarmament. The psychiatrist Jerome Frank thinks disarmament on the brink of war unlikely and advises American disarmament now, if necessary without agreement. Since disarmament would not, according to Frank, eliminate conflict, he urges "detailed, sophisticated, hard-headed analyses of possible methods of non-violent struggle" in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, so that disarmed Americans could resist even a nation that attempted military occupation of the United States.

On the other side, two of the editors adopt the stability model of peace. Quincy Wright defines "peaceful competition" as the elimination of international ideological conflict and domination, in favor of the principle established after the 17th-Century religious wars that every sovereign state should decide the religion of its inhabitants. Wright also calls for the strengthening of international law, the reduction of international tensions through such techniques as cultural exchange and summit conferences, and the stabilization of the present balance of world power. Morton Deutsch argues that much of the existing world conflict is based on misperceptions on both sides of the Cold War. He urges the acceptance by each side of the other's legitimate existence, the recognition of common values and interests, and the articulation of rules for international orderly behavior as techniques for reconstructing international perceptions.

A more "unilateral" version of the stability world than the Wright and Deutsch proposals for cooperation is set forth by Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School, who argues that it is far easier for each nation to bind and control itself with internal rules and balances so as to keep the world stable than it is for all nations to reach agreements to set up any international institution capable of creating world balances and enforcing world rules that would preserve stability.

Unfortunately, the editors of *Preventing World War III* make no clear distinction between the "conflict" and "stability" strategies, or as some would say, between "preventing war" and establishing peace, nor is there any direct confrontation between the two approaches. "Stability" strategists were not asked to show how the real conflicts of the Cold War might disappear, and "conflict" strategists were not required to explain what central institutions would be needed to keep competing nations from taking up arms. Perhaps the greatest difference between the two schools is that the conflict strategists are talking about the immediate future while the stability strategists are talking about the long run. But if so, this factor should have been explicitly examined.

Two other clusters of ideas in the book deserve special attention. One, concerning "inspection" is embodied in a group of papers by Karl Deutsch, Seymour Melman, Lewis Bohn, and

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Ralph Gerard. All attempt to set forth ways of inspecting for disarmament that bypass the physical difficulties of finding hidden bombs and focus on psychological or sociological means of discovering the guilty knowledge of hidden bombs.

For example, Bohn suggests the possibilities of inspections the whereabouts and pursuits of scientists who might have been diverted to rearmament, the use of lie detectors on policy-makers to examine their knowledge of secret rearming activities, and the use of rewards to encourage citizens to tip off the police about clandestine violators. Melman reports the willingness of large numbers of people to say they would report their own countrymen for secretly rearming. Although such means might conceivably seem even more threatening to national soverignty than would thorough physical inspections, the ideas should be pursued.

The other proposal of special interest is William Evan's, a sociologist at the Bell Telephone Laboratories, for "transnational forums." He suggests that the present focus on the nation-state as the political unit that must make peace may be mistaken, and that non-governmental organization of businessmen, trade unions and scientists could make direct contact to deal with a number of issues.

A good part of the rest of the book might well have been left out. Moralizations on the role of world science in improving the planet and drawing men together; on a universal auxiliary language; on a "Conciliation Committee" of eminent men who would, simply by meeting often, allow "the mellowing influence of propinquity" to shape a "state of mind in which agreement seemed possible – all these noble urges have, I fear, little to do with preventing World War III or building a workable peace.

MOVIES

From Chekhov to China

The Lady with the Dog, based on Chekhov's short story, is the best Russian film I have seen since the second part of Eisenstein's *Ivan*. It was adapted and directed by Josef Heifitz, co-director of (among many others) the unforgettable *Baltic Deputy*, and was exceptionally well photographed by Andrei Moskvin who worked on *Ivan* and on Donskoi's *Gorky* trilogy.

The Lady with the Dog (Artkino)
The Criminal Life of Archibaldo de la Cruz (New Yorker Theater)
The Manchurian Candidate (UA)

Chekhov's exquisite story concerns Dimitri Gurov, a Moscow banker in early middle age, married to an unattractive wife, who goes alone to Yalta on vacation and there meets a young provincial wife. Like him, Anna is unhappily married and is vacationing alone; unlike him, she is inexperienced and unworldly. They have an affair, during which she weeps a good deal, berating herself. This, of course, quickly bores him although he courteously hides it. Back in Moscow he soon sinks again into his deadening routine of office, club, cheerless home, expecting to forget Anna as he has forgotten many others. But retroactively her innocence and pathos work on him and, parted from her, he falls in love with her after the event. He seeks her out in her town, and they begin a long, sporadic relationship, seeing each other every year or two for a short while when she can persuade her husband to let her visit Moscow. Gurov sees that he has two lives: the hidden one that contains everything that is worthwhile and important about him; and the surface life that contains everything he despises.

> "And judging others by himself, he did not believe the things he saw, and assumed that everybody else also had his real vital life passing under a veil of mystery as under the cover of night. Every man's intimate existence is kept mysterious, and

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perhaps, in part, because of that, civilized people are so nervously anxious that a personal secret should be respected."

Heifitz has succeeded in achieving the Chekhovian essence: a paradoxically increasing dramatic tension about a slackening social tension. One of the more difficult jobs in art is to convey tedium without becoming tedious. The secret is to convince us that the hero is as sensitive as we are and that, in his situation, we too should be bored. Thus we suffer with him, not because of him. Heifitz never lets the malaise go too far. He establishes it swiftly (the opening shot is an empty vodka bottle floating among the rocks near the beach) and *uses* it, instead of lolling in it.

High among the film's subtleties is its depiction of class strata. Without any heavy party-line underscoring, it tells us – with its snow-covered coachmen waiting in the freezing night, its waiters hopping to the tantrums of the mighty – of Gurov's world, where extreme power and indifference to the lowest class can have the effect (as in the Deep South) of secretly creating self-hate in a man of feeling.

Alexei Batalov, the handsome and capable actor who was in the overrated *Cranes Are Flying*, plays Gurov. Iya Savvina, the Anna, has a three-note twittery voice that is at first dismaying; as the film progresses, we see that Heifitz took a chance on her and won. He wants her to affect us the way she affected Gurov, her very limitations eventually becoming her chief attractions. An actress of range might have done the part better in some ways but would have run the risk of subconsciously suggesting too much competence and awareness.

"MENON IS A *principal symbol of a narrow, anti-Western, misanthropic neutralist defeatism. To give aid to India—which we should do—is in some measure to rescue both Menon and Nehru from the consequences of facing up to their mischievous miscalculations—i.e., save them from personally well-deserved military humiliations at the hands of their beloved friends, the Red Chinese.*"

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Two small reservations. Some of the transitions are choppy. As in many good European films of the thirties, we get the impression of being served large, finely modulated sections, not quite as well knit together as they might be. And the closing moments are somewhat abrupt, too final. They do not quite catch the mood of Chekhov's last lines: "To both of them it was clear that the end was still very far off, and their hardest and most difficult period was only just beginning."

Luis Bunuel's *The Criminal Life of Archibaldo de la Cruz* begins like one of his conventional unconventional films, with blood, razors, and sexuality all commingled. Surprisingly it turns out to be a comic view of these matters, although it never really makes you laugh. Because of a childhood experience, a wealthy young Mexican associates desire with killing and tries to murder several beautiful women. In each case either he is beaten to the punch by someone else who kills the girl or an interruption saves the proposed victim. The film has little of the remarkable textures that Bunuel has often achieved; its composition – pictorially and rhythmically – is commonplace. But its narrative is lively and it has the added interest – for those who know other works of this talented sadist – of self-satire.

The Manchurian Candidate has a clever gimmick: the Chinese Reds brainwash an American officer (Laurence Harvey) captured in the Korean War and make of him a psychological time-bomb. They bury ideas and obedience in him and plan to "detonate" him after he returns home and reaches an influential position. The cleverness is obfuscated with enough further gimmicks to furnish three or four other films: in addition to the Red plot, a McCarthyite plot to take over America; a domineering mother who is not only a plotter but has incestuous feeling for her son; an arbitrarily busted and patched romance with a liberal Senator's daughter; hypnotisms, dreams, and plentiful murders. Frank Sinatra, Harvey's Army pal and eventual nemesis, arrives with his usual built-in plot. Every Sinatra part has to have a scene in which he beats up a bigger man (here it is a karate fight); and there must be a girl who, on sight, wants to go to bed with him and then falls overwhelmingly in love with him. The reasons for all this are between the slight Mr. Sinatra and his analyst.

The picture features the supposedly sharp, sexy dialogue of George Axelrod, hard as rusty nails; and it has been directed by John Frankenheimer with an eagerness to distinguish himself that is matched only by his memory of Hitchcock films.

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

RECORDS

Klemperer's Fidelio

Beethoven's only opera, *Fidelio*, hasn't achieved in this country the position it has in Europe; but it has some of the greatest and most affecting dramatic music after Mozart's. Not only Leonore's famous *"Abscheulicher!"* recitative leading to the noble aria *"Komm, Hoffnung,"* but the wonderful quartet *"Mir ist so wunderbar,"* the affecting duet *"Wir muessen gleich zu Werke,"* the tremendous introduction to the dungeon scene and Florestan's *"Welch' Dunkel hier,"* the affecting duet and trio and dramatic quartet that follow, and the sublime *"O Gott! welch' ein Augenblick!"* at the end. Apprehensive after Klemperer's strange slow-motion performances of Beethoven's *Pastoral* and *Eroica* Symphonies with the Philadelphia Orchestra in New York, I was agreeably surprised by a *Fidelio*, on Angel 3625 (mono; I didn't hear the stereo version), which – except for an excessively and ineffectively slow conclusion of Act 1 – moved in tempos sufficiently related to the words like *Allegro* and *Andante con moto* in the score to give the music its expressive character and effect. Not, sometimes – *e.g.* in Pizarro's aria, and in the intro-

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ductory recitatives of Leonore's and Florestan's arias – the effect it would have if it moved a little faster; and not, throughout, the effect imparted by Toscanini's pacing; but enough to make the performance satisfying. And it has what Toscanini's performance doesn't have; superb singing of the principal roles. Christa Ludwig's mezzo-soprano voice lacks warmth and is tremulous, but has the required range and power, and lends itself to being deployed in sustained phrasing with the required nobility and grandeur of style. Jon Vickers' Florestan retains its magnificence even with the lessened splendor and ease in his top range. And Gottlob Frick is an excellent Rocco. The other singers are acceptable; the Philharmonia Orchestra and Chorus admirable.

Completely satisfying is Klemperer's pacing of Bach's St. Matthew Passion on Angel 3599 (mono), which has superb singing by Peter Pears (the Evangelist) and Fischer-Dieskau (Jesus) and excellent singing also by Christa Ludwig, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf and the Philharmonia Chorus. The Philharmonia Orchestra is again admirable.

Handel's unfamiliar opera *Alcina*, on London A-4361 and OSA-1361, offers a profusion of arias, most of them very fine in their varied styles, but in a context, unfortunately, of boring recitative concerned with a preposterous dramatic action. Unfortunately, also, in the very first phrase sung by Joan Sutherland one hears the moaning that has been a mannerism of her singing carried now to an extreme of mannered miniature crooning that makes her performances of most of her arias unbearable – the exceptions being the ones in fast tempo which compel her to sing out in full voice, with an accuracy and style in the florid passages that are breathtaking. But fortunately there is superb singing by the other soloists: Graziella Sciutti, Teresa Berganza, Monica Sinclair, Mirella Freni, Luigi Alva and Ezio Flagello. And with it there is sensitive and spirited playing of the orchestral part by the London Symphony under Richard Bonynge, and George Malcolm's richly elaborating playing of the continuo on the harpsichord.

The mezzo-soprano Rita Gorr, on Angel 35795 (mono), uses with expressive power a voice which is metallic in full volume and whose range is adequate for the soprano pieces from *Lohengrin* and *Tristan und Isolde* as well as the contralto arias from *Orfeo ed Euridice*, *Il Trovatore*, *Don Carlo* and *Samson et Dalila*. The soprano Regine Crespin, who sings Wagner's Wesendonck Songs and excerpts from his operas on Angel 35832 (mono), I find unimpressive in voice and style. The young contralto Grace Bumbry has a fresh, big voice which lacks warmth and is a little tremulous, so that it doesn't achieve the sustained tension of phrase that is needed for effective performance of the songs of Schubert, Brahms, Wolf and Strauss on Deutsche Grammophon 18-635 and 138-635, but is more adequate in the arias from *Orfeo*, *Carmen*, *Don Carlo* and other operas on 18-826 and 138-826.

Rococo 36, *Caruso in Ensemble*, offers a final duet of *Aida* with beautiful singing by Gadski, the quartet and quintet from *Un Ballo in Maschera* with a few phrases from Hempel, the trio from *I Lombardi* with Alda; and there are excerpts from *The Pearl Fishers*, *La Forza del Destino*, *Rigoletto* and *Lucia* with Abbott, Sembrich, Homer, Ancona, Scotti and Amato. But almost half a side is wasted on excerpts from *Martha*.

Leonard Bernstein's excellent performance of the first three movements of Berlioz' *Harold in Italy* with the New York Philharmonic, on Columbia ML-5758 and MS-6358, seems to indicate his realization that to achieve the effect Berlioz wants one must accept the tempo he sets for the purpose with the metronome. But in the middle of the finale, where the absence of any direction from Berlioz makes it clear that he intends the tempo to continue unchanged, and where the proclamations of trombones and tuba in the unchanged tempo were electrifying in Toscanini's performance, Bernstein's flawed taste asserts itself to slow down the tempo for proclamations that as a result are blatantly overemphatic. And near the end there is a sentimentalizing slowing down of the recollection of the pilgrim's march of the second move-

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ment of the work.

Adherence to Berlioz' tempos contributed to the effectiveness of Toscanini's performance of *Romeo and Juliet,* which contains some of Berlioz' most marvelous music – not only the familiar *Love Scene* and *Queen Mab,* but the extraordinary *Juliet's Funeral Procession* and *Romeo in the Vault of Capulets,* which we didn't hear until Toscanini performed the entire work in 1942. His repetition of the work in 1947 was processed under his supervision for release on records by RCA Victor, which, however, hasn't released it, claiming that the recorded sound is too poor. This isn't true; and it seems more probable that Victor has wanted to protect the first Munch-Boston Symphony recording of 1953 and the new one on LD- and LDS-6098. The new one has less wrong with it than the first; but there are still tempos different from Berlioz' that produce a less effective result – *e.g.* the slower tempo in which *Great Festivities at the Capulets'* hasn't the verve and elan it has in Berlioz' tempo; the whipping up of excessive speed at one point in the *Love Scene* where Berlioz writes *animato un poco,* followed by the slowing down where Berlioz writes *piu animato,* which is less effective than the gradual acceleration Berlioz asks for. And both *Juliet's Funeral Procession* and *Romeo in the Vault of the Capulets* haven't the expressive intensity they have in Toscanini's performance. But Monteux's wrong tempos, in his performance with the London Symphony on Westminster XWN-2233 and WST-233, are more numerous and more damaging; the performance has even less expressive intensity; the orchestra plays less beautifully; Regina Resnik's wobbly voice is less enjoyable than the beautiful voice of Rosalind Elias in the Munch performance. Of the two, then, the Munch is preferable.

B. H. HAGGIN

THEATER

The Keynes of Times Square

In a country without plays, the public's attention fastens on the player. Improvising from his own character, creating his own script, the actor has become the subject of countless interviews in newspapers, magazines, and books. In Hollywood, which also has no dramatic art, such interviews are commonplaces – Sidney Skolsky and the gossip columnists have always been dependable sources of information about the eating, sleeping, and coupling habits of the stars. Today, however, in a more dignified format, Broadway actors are conversing freely not only about their private lives but also about their professional lives – about what everyone has agreed to call their "art." Since there are as few genuinely creative spirits among contemporary players as among contemporary playwrights, I find it significant that the word "artist" is so promiscuously applied to the one, so chastely to the other (playwrights are more frequently called "craftsmen"). For this, I suspect, we have the Actors Studio to thank – an institution which has inflated the importance of the actor's calling at the expense of the author's. Very few interpretive performers are intellectuals, but Method actors are especially famous for their ignorance of, and indifference to, that higher art which actors have traditionally served. Like most products of professional education (teacher's college graduates, for example), they are much more concerned with techniques of communication than with the objects to be communicated. If you want this documented, consult the index of an interview book like Lillian Ross' *The Player: Profile of an Art,* and count the number of references to Ibsen (two), Brecht (three), and Shakespeare (none), as compared with the number to Lee Strasberg, Elia Kazan, and the Actors Studio (Forty-three).

Reviewing Miss Ross' book, and observing the numerous testimonials to Strasberg, Norman Podhoretz draws this conclusion: "Considering how many bad plays have been saved by

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actors who did indeed turn themselves into the characters they were portraying, one might say that Lee Strasberg has done for the commercial theater in America what Lord Keynes did for capitalism." The comparison is very true, though I doubt that history will thank either man. Like the economic reforms of Keynes, the histrionic reforms of Strasberg reinvigorated a sick institution which was threatening to expire from its own fakery, inadequacy, and incompetence. Keynes' innovations, however, seem to have been rather more effective, for while Capitalism still retains a certain energy, Broadway has now shrivelled away, the Method having become just another of its feeble stereotypes. The last Broadway play I saw, primarily staffed by Studio people, was *The Fun Couple* – a performance so agonizingly amateurish that I began to feel nostalgic about the pre-Method artificialities of Guthrie McClintic.

I hear the objection that it is unfair to arraign the Actors Studio for the felonies of its individual members; after all, the Studio is not a producing unit, but a place where actors are supposed to perfect their craft. I am, however, getting rather bored with this argument, and I no longer find it convincing. The Studio takes refuge in pedagogical disinterestedness when its members fail, but it has never been reluctant to exploit their successes. Then one must ask, why has the Studio been satisfied, all these years, to feed its members into a debased commercial system where such failures become inevitable? What is the purpose of histrionic truth when it serves nothing but dramatic falsehood? The fact is that Strasberg's reforms have all been too limited, too timid, too superficial – like those of a prose stylist who raises the quality of advertising copy. Unlike Stanislavsky, who invented a new acting technique in order to mount dramatic masterworks, thereby transforming the Russian theater, Strasberg has been the interior decorator of a crumbling structure whose foundations he has done nothing to change. The Actors Studio is now about fifteen years old, and world famous. But can its achievements be seriously compared with those of Joan Littlewood, Jean Vilar, or Bertolt Brecht? Has it become identified either with a new approach to classical repertory or with a radical new modern dramatic movement?

Quite the contrary, it has become identified with Broadway, for which its well-publicized Method seems to be tailor-made. As I remarked two years ago: "The Studio actor, confined to his own psychic biography, has been unable to make the essential imaginative leap into another's life, with the result that he tends to play himself over and over again. Thus, the Studio Method is most appropriate to the commercial theater, where type casters seize on a single saleable commodity for merciless exploitation." This accounts for the multitude of Studio Actors in Hollywood, the land of personality-mongers; and like the Group Theater, the Actors Studio has been unable or unwilling to help its members resist the blandishments of the West Coast. I am quite aware that the actor, one of the most unfulfilled workers in our culture, has little to choose between Broadway and Hollywood. Since neither medium offers artistic satisfaction, he might as well accept the greater money, fame, and power. Still, one wonders about the more influential Studio associates, past and present. Marlon Brando, by returning to Broadway in carefully selected roles, could revolutionize our theater overnight: his mutinies remain confined to the Bounty. Elia Kazan has the power to direct any play he chooses: he chooses *Splendor in the Grass*, while no doubt preparing to bring the same vernal glory to Lincoln Square. As for the actors who have remained in New York, none (shall we except Strasberg's daughter, Susan, who wants to play Camille?) have shown any inclination towards any but narrow naturalistic roles; and really gifted performers like Geraldine Page and Kim Stanley are continually repeating themselves with nervously mannered portrayals.

One must finally conclude that the

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

John Wain's *newest novel is* Strike the Father Dead. Richard Tillinghast *is a young poet who has only recently begun to publish.* Arthur I. Waskow *is a member of the senior staff of the Peace Research Institute.*

PAUL GOODMAN

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Actors Studio, instead of being a temple of high theatrical ideals, has come to reflect the most pernicious qualities of our theater: the glamor and pretentiousness, the fear of risk, the lust for fame, the quick success. The Studio is now at the height of its notoriety – the object of benefits, testimonials, and Kulchural winks from the White House – but this testifies less to its appetite for art than to its passion for publicity. Lee Strasberg, a monastic figure with tremendous charisma, has attracted a fanatical following; but a great teacher sets a great example, and little that is exemplary in the way of selflessness and humility has recently been seen from that quarter. Strasberg's insulted snit over Lincoln Center is a case in point – a real man of the theater would have been proud to be excluded from that cultural frou-frou – and the way in which the Studio exploited the tragic aspirations of Marilyn Monroe was nothing short of scandalous. Well, the Studio is preparing to inaugurate its own theater. Eternally optimistic, I wish it godspeed. In the meantime, I am looking around for a much more revolutionary figure than Lee Strasberg to bring the theater back to life. Keynes succeeded in reforming our economic system through melioration and compromise, for politics, as we are always told, is the art of the possible. But art is the politics of the impossible, and compromise is not enough. What Broadway needs is not a Keynes but a Marx – not one who will trim its toenails, but one who will lop off its malignant limbs.

ROBERT BRUSTEIN

Correspondence

Brinkmanship Revisited

Sirs:

There is no denying that, by a master stroke of cultivated surprise and almost unilateral stiff resistance to the Soviet-Cuban challenge, Washington (with a boost from China in the far Himalayas) has changed the world's diplomatic face, *perhaps* favorably for the West. For, despite the limited gain Chairman Khrushchev may now find in posing as the champion of world salvation, unquestionably Moscow has been forced to retreat.

Hence: 1) Khrushchev's "appeasement" in Cuba, according to some Kremlinologists, lends weight to Russian "China lobby" charges that Khrushchev is "soft" on capitalism, thereby straining his and Moscow's claim to Communist world leadership; 2) the confidence of indigenous Communist movements in Moscow's brand of Marxist-Leninism would seem gravely subverted; 3) at least in Latin America, as in the eyes of Governor Leonel Brizola, Brazil's ultra-nationalist leftist leader, Premier Castro has been discredited as a Soviet lackey and the Cuban revolution deemed "seriously compromised"; 4) somewhat unexpectedly, the Western Hemisphere has found a unity never before achieved on the question of Communist infiltration; 5) despite prior misgivings, our NATO allies demonstrated resolute loyalty as well as renewed confidence in American defense declarations; 6) Russia has admitted the feasibility of "on site" international inspection, a concession not even demanded by U Thant; and, 7) while the "uncommitted" nations proved of minimal influence, the United Nations itself appears at least temporarily strengthened due to resort had to it by the big powers.

While we cannot yet fully predict the profound ramifications of Washington's "all out" policy (an indefinite intensification of East-West tensions is obviously possible), these developments make clear that today's "liberal" must re-evaluate his heretofore unequivocal and total resistance to "brinkmanship" diplomacy. He must now recognize that there is a place for "get tough" measures in our diplomatic arsenal. This is not to say, however, that the "liberal" approach is now simply to be ignored, for the value of "hard" tactics in general and of Washington's Cuba policy in particular must not be over-estimated. Why?

First, Cuba is, only ninety miles away, and in an area long recognized by the Soviets as within our sphere of influence. Not so Vietnam, Berlin or India. Without courting global disaster, can we realistically expect equal success through such power plays in, say, the Dardanelles?

Second, we cannot assume, as do those

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who confuse sanity for "appeasement," that new crises can each time be treated by similar means with equal effectiveness. An injudicious use of "brinkmanship" diplomacy could push us over the brink.

Finally, Washington might not have succeeded without the United Nations which, however weak, was proven an indispensable ingredient of our diplomatic strategy. Absent an international forum to which the United States could turn to clarify and reaffirm its demands while the Soviet Union, behind a face-saving front of verbal bluster, formulated its sane response, the momentum of events might have led, irresistibly, to global castastrophe. We can speak of triumph only because we are still here.

Clearly, the "liberal" approach of moderation cannot have been repudiated. Indeed, the repercussions of our Cuban venture, together with the increasingly bitter portents of the Sino-Indian conflict, demand a heightened and unprecedented caution. There is a time and place for both "hard" and "soft" strategies. Hopefully, Cuba has taught this to the "liberal." It is also to be hoped the "conservative," despite his momentary vindication, will learn the same lesson.

Burns H. Weston
New York City

Creeps Grow in Brooklyn

Sirs:

"Creeps Grow in Brooklyn," (November 3) is something of a literary striptease. There is scarcely a city high school that has not on occasion endured the infliction of one of these superior young men who are so obsessed with the urge to demonstrate the inferiority of their charges that it never occurs to them that they might roll up their sleeves and do an honest job of work developing such potentialities as they may possess.

Did it ever enter Brer Berkman's head it might be better to bring a few copies of *The New Republic* to class rather than asking, probably with a somewhat superior smirk, how many had ever heard of it?

There are many discouragements in the teaching trade, but after some four decades spent practicing the craft I have never yet seen a group that did not respond to the efforts of an able and conscientious teacher. If the superior Mr. Berkman would end his exercise in narcissism and really work on his charges he might be surprised at the result.

Theodore F. Whitehead
Los Angeles, Calif.

Dave Berkman has afforded me that most exquisite of pleasures, the joy of feeding fat an ancient grudge against callow pontification. That he is perceptive enough to see that society has some serious problems is, though not unique, still laudable; that he lacks the critical faculty to understand the nature of the objections to the hyperbolic rhetorical flights of Max Rafferty is lamentable. Rafferty (even as Berkman) has made no useful contribution; rather, he (and Berkman) merely pandered to cheap taste but quit when the going got sticky.

Blackboard Jungle has been written several times already, and Berkman failed dismally to engage the nature of the intellectual morality that is Rafferty. I can only assume that The *New Republic* wished its readers to join Berkman and Rafferty in their campaign against ravaging little girls. Okay, I'll take the pledge.

Ward Fulcher
East Bakersfield High School
Bakersfield, Calif.

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

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